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SUPREMACY CLAUSE TEXTUALISM
Henry Paul Monaghan*
Whatever its status in the statutory interpretation "wars," originalismdriven textualism has assumed an increasingly prominent role in constitutional interpretation,at least within the academy. The focus of this Article
is on one such form, namely, "Supremacy Clause textualism",- that is, recent
textualist claims about the implications of the Supremacy Clause of Article
VI. This Article addresses two such claims.
First, in important articles, ProfessorBradford Clark argues that the
clause is "atthe epicenter of [our] constitutionalstructure"and it "recognizes
only the 'Constitution,' 'Laws,' and 'Treaties' of the United States as 'the
supreme Law of the Land."' Displacement of otherwise governing state law
can occur only through one of those enumerated modes and "Laws" refers
only to Acts of Congress. The consequence is thatfederal common law-as
that concept is now currently understood-andadministrative lawmaking
are illegitimate, at least when measured by the original understanding.
Second, this Article addresses the claims of true Supremacy Clause textualists. Pointing to "This Constitution" as the "supreme Law," several
prominent academics, including Professors Amar, Lawson, and Paulsen,
advocate rejection of almost all judicialprecedent inconsistent with an original understanding-driventextualism.
This Article examines at length the contestable historical claims of
Supremacy Clause textualists, particularly assigning to the Clause a substantialstate-protective role while discounting its nationalistfoundations. It
then turns to Supremacy Clause textualism's internalproblems, such as its
inability to accountfor the administrative lawmaking and federal common
law that now characterizeour constitutionalorder. It next describes the intellectual world of the founding generationand its understandingof the nature
of law, a world that has now disappeared. Finally, this Article challenges
those Supremacy Clause textualists-true fundamentalists-who would
deny the authoritativenature of precedent in our constitutionalsystem. In
the process, this Article doubts that any form of originalism/textualism, either theoretically or in practice, can remotely provide an adequate account of
our practice of constitutional adjudication.
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CONCLUSION
The erection of a new government, whatever care or wisdom
may distinguish the work, cannot fail to originate questions of
intricacy and nicety; ... [t]ime only can mature and perfect so
compound a system, liquidate the meaning of all the parts, and
adjust them to each other in a harmonious and consistent
WHOLE.'
INTRODUCTION:

THE ALLURE OF SUPREMACY CLAUSE TEXTUALISM

The guns in the statutory interpretation wars are now largely silent.
The assaults waged by the textualists against the purposivist approach of
the Legal Process School 2 have largely abated.3 In retrospect, it is diffi1. The Federalist No. 82, at 453-54 (Alexander Hamilton) (Robert Ferguson ed.,
2006).
2. See generally Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic
Problems in the Making and Application of Law 1374-80 (William N. Eskridge,Jr. & Philip
P. Frickey eds., Found. Press 1994) (1958) (describing principles of statutory
interpretation that charge court "to put itself in imagination in the position of the
legislature which enacted the measure"). For a powerful restatement and defense of the
Legal Process position, see Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court's judicial Passivity, 2002
Sup. Ct. Rev. 343, 378-410 ("[E]xclusive reliance on legislative specification in textual
provisions is not to be preferred to reliance, instead, on a broader judicial role in giving
meaning to federal statutes . . . .").

3. But they have not abated entirely. See, e.g., Spivey v. Vertrue, Inc., 528 F.3d 982,
984-85 (7th Cir. 2008) ("Legislative history may help disambiguate a cloudy text by
showing how words work in context; it does not permit a judge to turn a clear text on its
head."). Contrary to judges writing for other circuits, ChiefJudge Easterbrook held that a
statute that provides for an appeal from an order denying removal "not less than seven
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cult to tell what the intense fighting was all about, except perhaps at the
margins.4 For example, reading John Manning, textualism's leading academic exponent, feels very much like reading Hart and Sacks.5
Textualists have made an important contribution by forcing statutory interpreters to take the enacted text seriously; but they have persuaded few,
if any, trained in the old school that, as the directive force of the statutory
text attenuates, one can dispense with a comprehensive consideration of
legislative purpose in determining statutory meaning.6 Indeed, in some
days" after the order's entry must be applied literally. Id. at 983-84. It is noteworthy,
however, thatJudge Easterbrook went out of his way to demonstrate that no absurd results
occurred from such a literal application of the statute. Id. at 985.
4. Like most academians, I focus on the work of the federal courts and the academy.
Abbe Gluck's fascinating and important new essay points out that there is a fierce-and
enlightening-war going on in some state courts between textualists and purposivists, with
an unanticipated and normatively attractive form of textualism emerging. See Abbe R.
Gluck, Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Modified Textualism and Methodological
Consensus in the States, 119 Yale L.J. (forthcoming Apr. 2010) (advancing theory of
"modified textualism" that recognizes differences between "state and federal
methodologies; namely, the state textualists' embrace of methodological stare decisis, their
willingness to compromise over legislative history, and their creation of strictly tiered
interpretive histories").
5. See generally John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106
Colum. L. Rev. 70 (2006) [hereinafter Manning, What Divides] (describing similarities and
differences between two schools); PeterJ. Smith, Textualism and jurisdiction, 108 Colum.
L. Rev. 1883, 1898-1905 (2008) [hereinafter Smith, Textualism] (same). Professor
Manning observes that:
Modern textualists . .. are not literalists. In contrast to . . . the "plain meaning"

school, they do not claim that interpretation can occur "within the four corners"
of a statute, or that "the duty of interpretation does not arise" when a text is
"plain." Rather, modem textualists acknowledge that language has meaning only
in context . . .. [Tlhey believe that statutory language, like all language, conveys
meaning only because a linguistic community attaches common understandings
to words and phrases, and relies on shared conventions for deciphering those
words and phrases in particular contexts.
John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 108-09
(2001) (citations omitted). For an excellent introductory overview, see Richard Fallon et
al., Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 616-26 (6th ed. 2009)
[hereinafter Hart and Wechsler, Sixth Edition].
6. Nor, for that matter, do many textualists: "[WIhen modern textualists find a
statutory text to be ambiguous, they believe that statutory purpose . . . is itself a relevant
ingredient of statutory context." Manning, What Divides, supra note 5, at 75-76. At the
end of the day, the central differences between the two schools are, first, the more
restricted range of materials (e.g., the exclusion of legislative history) that textualists are
willing to consider in decoding statutory meaning; and second, and of more importance,
the willingness of the Legal Process School to constrain even "clear" texts through
consideration of legislative purpose. For examples of the former, see Riegel v. Medtronic,
Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1009 n.5 (2008) (Scalia, J.) ("[I]f one were to speculate upon
congressional purposes, the best evidence for that would be found in the statute."); Engine
Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 252 (2004) (stating
presumption that "the ordinary meaning of [statutory] language accurately expresses the
legislative purpose" (quoting Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194
(1985))). Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, on the other hand, is the leading
example of the latter. 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892) ("It is a familiar rule, that a thing may be
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areas, such as preemption, many textualist judges are willing to consider
legislative purpose.7
Matters stand quite differently, however, if we turn to the dispute
over proper methods of constitutional interpretation. Here, textualism
has assumed an increasingly prominent role, at least within the academy.8
Of course, textualist arguments can come in many shapes. 9 The initial
focus of this Article is on one such form, namely, "Supremacy Clause textualism"; that is, recent textualist claims about the Supremacy Clause of
Article VI.10 A brief overview of the work of a few of textualism's leading
proponents in this area-Bradford Clark, Michael Ramsey, and otherswill set the stage for an analysis of the faults and weaknesses of not only
originalism-grounded Supremacy Clause textualism, but of any form of
originalism as providing an adequate theory for constitutional
adjudication.
A. Bradford Clark
In an important and ever-lengthening series of articles," Professor
Bradford Clark argues that the Supremacy Clause is "the provision at the
epicenter of the constitutional structure created by the Founders."' 2 His
within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit,
nor within the intention of its makers.").
7. Meltzer, supra note 2, at 362-78 (describing textualists' use of legislative purpose in
preemption cases); see also Smith, Textualism, supra note 5, at 1923-31 (arguing
textualists have approached broad jurisdictional grants in nontextualist manner in order to
promote policy of judicial restraint).
8. Unsurprisingly, Professor Manning is prominent in this arena as well. See John F.
Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional Interpretation, 122
Harv. L. Rev. 2003, 2048-55 (2009) [hereinafter Manning, Federalism) (arguing
federalism is body of discrete doctrines, not some independently freestanding principle);
John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise Constitutional
Texts, 113 Yale LJ. 1663, 1669-71 (2004) [hereinafter Manning, Precise Texts] (arguing
Eleventh Amendment's precise terms should prevail over "strongly purposive method of
constitutional reasoning").
9. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights (1998) (exploring Bill of Rights from
textualist perspective). For a sharp criticism of Amar's work on both its textual
methodology and historical understanding, see William Michael Treanor, Taking Text Too
Seriously: Modern Textualism, Original Meaning, and the Case of Amar's Bill ofRights, 106
Mich. L. Rev. 487 (2007).
10. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
11. See, e.g., AnthonyJ. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Federal Common Law of
Nations, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (2009); see also Craig Green, EDie and Problems of
Constitutional Structure, 96 Cal. L. Rev. 661, 661 n.1 (2008) (collecting numerous articles
by Professor Clark). As one commentator observes, "Bradford Clark may have drawn more
lessons from the Supremacy Clause than anyone in history." Id. at 661. Professor Green
continues: "For Clark, these few dozen words govern more than federal preemption. They
also influence his interpretation of dormant commerce power, executive agreements,
certification, the Eighth Amendment, Marbury, EDie, federal common law, and a great deal
else." Id.
12. Bradford R. Clark, Federal Lawmaking and the Role of Structure in Constitutional
Interpretation, 96 Cal. L. Rev. 699, 724 (2008) [hereinafter Clark, Role of Structure].
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argument is lean, elegant, and appealing. Recognizing that many constitutional provisions are the product of compromise and that the constitutional text's apparent clarity is frequently an illusion, Clark nonetheless
insists that the compromises that generated the Supremacy Clause resulted in "relatively clear and precise" language. 13 He argues that "the
Supremacy Clause recognizes only the 'Constitution,' 'Laws,' and
'Treaties' of the United States as 'the supreme Law of the Land,' 1 4 and
displacement of what would be the otherwise governing state law can occur only through one of those enumerated modes.' 5 These categories, in
turn, correspond to the three national lawmaking procedures elsewhere
set out in the Constitution: adopting and amending "the Constitution";1 6
enacting "Laws" under the bicameralism and presentment requirements
of Article I, Section 7;17 and making "Treaties."' 8
Professor Clark frequently describes the constitutionally prescribed
procedures governing national lawmaking as "finely wrought and exhaustively considered."1 9 And Clark proffers an attractive originalism-based
functionalism for his thesis: "By design," he states, "all three sets of procedures require the participation and assent of the states or their representatives in the Senate."2 0 Federal lawmaking was thus consciously held
hostage to the "political safeguards of federalism," to borrow Herbert
Wechsler's famous phrase. 2 1 For Clark, the role of the Senate is central:
"The Senate is the only federal institution that the Constitution requires
to participate in the adoption of all three forms of federal law recognized
by the Supremacy Clause. This was no accident. The Founders specifically designed the Senate to represent the states in the new federal
government."2 2
13. Bradford R. Clark, Constitutional Compromise and the Supremacy Clause, 83
Notre Dame L. Rev. 1421, 1424-25 (2008) [hereinafter Clark, Constitutional
Compromise].
14. See Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 Tex.
L. Rev. 1321, 1330 (2001) [hereinafter Clark, Separation of Powers] (emphasis added).
15. Id. at 1338.
16. Article VII, of course, provides that the ratification of "this Constitution" by nine
states sufficed for its establishment as the Constitution of the United States for the ratifying
states. U.S. Const. art. VII. Article V provides the manner of proposing and ratifying
amendments: They become "Part of this Constitution" when ratified by three quarters of
the states. Id. art. V.
17. Id. art. I, § 7.
18. The Treaty Clause provides that the President "shall have Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators
present concur." Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
19. See, e.g., Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 14, at 1324 (quoting INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983)).
20. Clark, Role of Structure, supra note 12, at 700.
21. Id. at 701 (quoting Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism:
The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54
Colum. L. Rev. 543, 543 (1954)).
22. Id. at 702-03.
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More recently, Professor Clark has sought to strengthen his historical
design claim by noting that the first appearance of the Supremacy Clause
on the floor of the Constitutional Convention came only one day after
the Great Compromise, through which the "small" (i.e., population
poor) states secured equal representation in the Senate. For him, that
juxtaposition further reinforces the idea that the Constitution meant to
condition displacement of state law only upon state-protective political
processes. Moreover, it also explicitly recognized "that small states would
have disproportionateinfluence in adopting 'the supreme Law of the Land."' In
short, the constitutional design was to ensure "the entrenchment of the
small states' influence."2 3
B. Michael Ramsey
Professor Michael Ramsey writes in a similar vein. 24 In an impressive
work in which he vigorously denies that the constitutional text is radically
incomplete on foreign affairs,2 5 Ramsey submits that, at the founding, the
concept of "executive Power"2 6 was well understood in America. It included not only the power to execute the law ("the 'dictionary' executive" 27 ), but also the "federative"2 8 (i.e., foreign affairs) power of the
Crown.2 9 The latter power remained with the executive except to the
extent that it was taken away and assigned to Congress or to the President
and the Senate. These takeaways, Ramsey acknowledges, were quite significant; nonetheless, an important residuum of "executive Power" remained, including the general conduct of foreign affairs. 30 For our purposes, what is of most interest is that Ramsey too emphasizes that, unless
the Constitution or a treaty is involved, otherwise applicable state law can
be displaced only by laws enacted pursuant to Article I, Section 7.31
A decision that has attracted the attention of both Professors Clark
and Ramsey, American Insurance Ass'n v. Garamendi,32 provides an excel23. Clark, Constitutional Compromise, supra note 13, at 1422-23 (emphasis added).
24. Michael D. Ramsey, The Constitution's Text in Foreign Affairs (2007).
25. For arguments to that effect by eminent writers, see, e.g., Louis Henkin, Foreign
Affairs and the United States Constitution 13-15 (2d ed. 1996) (noting that in drafting of
Constitution "very much about foreign relations went without or with little saying");
Harold Hongju Koh, The National Security Constitution 67-68 (1990) ("IJ]udgments
regarding how the constitution allocates particular powers in foreign affairs cannot be
reached solely by looking at constitutional text . .
26. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
27. Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 1,
3 (1993) [hereinafter Monaghan, Protective Power] (borrowing term from Harvey C.
Mansfield, Taming the Prince 2-4 (1989)).
28. See id. at 12-14 (discussing John Locke's taxonomy of executive powers).
29. Ramsey, supra note 24, at 61-65.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 285. Professor Ramsey does, however, retreat somewhat from this position.
See infra note 43 (noting Ramsey's belief that some constitutional provisions may
authorize federal common lawmaking).
32. 539 U.S. 396 (2003).
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lent window through which we can see the attractiveness and the resolving power of Supremacy Clause textualism. There, the Supreme Court,
five to four, invalidated California's Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief
Act, a burdensome disclosure statute enacted in response to widespread
confiscation of or refusal to honor life insurance policies held by
European Jews before and during the Second World War.3 3 The majority
held that the statute was inconsistent with the policies expressed in the
German Foundation Agreement, which President Clinton had signed in
2000, and in which Germany had agreed to establish a foundation to
compensate victims of Nazi persecution. 34 Although lacking any congressional authorization, the President had sought a global settlement of victims' claims; pursuant to that goal, he had agreed to submit to any
American court considering such claims a statement that "U.S. policy interests favor dismissal on any valid legal ground."3 5 The majority's conclusion that the President's executive agreement was alone sufficient to
displace the state law came as a shock to many (including this writer).
The only apparently relevant constitutional provision, the grant of the
"executive Power," does not confer lawmaking authority.3 6 And presidential displacement of state statutory law is surely lawmaking.3 7
Professors Clark and Ramsey both criticize the decision along
Supremacy Clause grounds. "Significantly," writes Professor Clark, "the
Supreme Court made no real attempt in .

.

. Garamendi to explain how

sole executive agreements attain the status of 'the supreme Law of the

33. Id. at 401, 408-12.
34. Id. at 420.
35. Id. at 406 (quoting Agreement Concerning the Foundation, "Remembrance,
7, July 17, 2000, 39 .L.M. 1298,
Responsibility and the Future," U.S.-F.R.G., Annex B,
1304).
36. See Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1369-70 (2008) (finding "exercise of
Presidential authority" does not "transform[ ] an international obligation into domestic
law"); Monaghan, Protective Power, supra note 27, at 12-32 ("[P] residential power . .. was
not understood to include the power to prescribe rules for the regulation of the rights of
American citizens."). Medellin runs against the grain of Garamendi. In Medellin, the Court
rejected the government's argument that a presidential determination that a non-selfexecuting treaty-the Vienna Convention-should be enforced domestically was sufficient
to override state procedural default rules. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1368-70. These two
decisions might be formally reconciled on the ground that, unlike in Garamendi, the
Medellin Court believed that the President was acting contra legem in trying to enforce a
non-self-executing treaty.
37. Perhaps presidential authority in Garamendi might have been subsumed under the
"recognition power," which may have some independent lawmaking component.
Compare Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 682-83 (1981), and Bradford R. Clark,
Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements, 93 Va. L. Rev. 1573, 1652 (2007) [hereinafter
Clark, Domesticating] ("To the extent that the President's recognition power is conferred
by the Constitution . . . the Supremacy Clause requires state and federal courts alike to
apply the doctrine."), with United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 333-37 (1937) (Stone,
J., concurring) (suggesting that "by mere executive action" President did not "intend[ ] to
alter the laws and policy of any state").
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Land' under the Supremacy Clause." 3 8 I quote Professor Ramsey at
greater length to demonstrate the appeal of this form of textualism:
The approach suggested earlier . .. indicates the correct textual
answer.... The Court and the President were right that [in light
of the executive power] the President did not need congressional authority to use diplomatic power to encourage the
Europeans to establish compensatory funds for Holocaust
victims ....
... Once we see the textual source of the President's power
in such matters, though, we also see its limitations. The
President's power is executive, which means, above all else, that
it is not legislative. The President does not need authorization
to pursue policies with respect to Holocaust compensation, but
cannot make law in support of those policies....
. . . It is important to see that giving the President preemptive power is in effect granting executive lawmaking power ....
In this respect the case parallels the Steel Seizure case,
which we found [earlier] to be an unconstitutional example of
presidential lawmaking....
... This reading of executive power fits with Article VI; ...
First, it should be clear that Congress cannot, merely by adopting a policy-even on something squarely within its enumerated
powers, such as interstate commerce-preempt state law.
Article VI requires that Congress make law "in Pursuance" of the
Constitution (i.e., through Article I, Section 7), not that it
merely adopt policies. The Court's result gives the President a
greater preemptive power than Congress has-surely an odd
result.
. . . Second, Article VI makes clear that only treaties approved by the Senate (that is, made "on the Authority" of the
United States, which requires Senate approval) are part of supreme law.

. .

. If Presidents could preempt state law merely by

establishing policies, then (a) even unapproved treaties-that is,
ones endorsed by the President but not yet approved by the
Senate-should be preemptive; and (b) including treaties in Article VI would be superfluous, because treaties would displace
state law by the preemptive force of the executive power to establish foreign policy. In sum, even on its face, Article VI's negative implication is powerful: it shows how preemption arises,
and it shows the only way preemption arises. 39
Professor Ramsey largely shares Professor Clark's views regarding the
Supremacy Clause. He sees Article VI as protecting the states "by requiring that preemptive actions follow channels in which the states retain material power." 40 By "negative implication," the Clause also specifies that
38. Clark, Domesticating, supra note 37, at 1617.
39. Ramsey, supra note 24, at 289-90.
40. d. at 294.
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which is not binding on the states. 4 1 In particular, Article I, Section 7's
enactment procedures ensured that the states would receive representation, which "was particularly true under the original Constitution, when
states controlled appointments to the Senate. Even in the House, members-being from specific geographic districts-were likely to have local
interests in mind to some extent."4 2 Because of the primacy of Article 1,
Section 7, Ramsey concludes that no federal common law of foreign relations was intended:
Nothing in the history of eighteenth-century courts, or in
the founding-era debates, suggests that anyone thought federal
courts had free-floating power to displace state law. The antifederalists' great worry that federal courts would use expansive
readings of treaties and the Constitution to displace state law
surely would have been a side issue if courts had a general common-law power of displacement.4 3
C. Other Supremacy Clause Textualists
Finally, mention must be made of another group of Supremacy
Clause textualists. Pointing to "This Constitution" as the "supreme Law,"
several prominent academics, including Professors Amar, Lawson, and
Paulsen, reject to varying degrees any judicial precedent inconsistent with
an original understanding-driven textualism. 44 Professor Lawson, for example, states that the Constitution "stands at the apex of our legal system
as supreme law" and thus requires courts to "search for the true meaning
of the Constitution."4 5 Accordingly, in any conflict between the
Constitution and a prior judicial decision, courts have an "obligation" to
41. Id. at 290.
42. Id. at 286.
43. Id. at 339 (emphasis omitted). Nonetheless, departing somewhat from Clark,
Ramsey offers what he considers the best argument in favor of a very limited federal
judicial common lawmaking power. Ramsey believes that some constitutional provisions
might authorize limited federal common lawmaking, such as the settlement of interstate
disputes. Id.
44. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court 2008 Term-Comment: Heller,
HLR, and Holistic Legal Reasoning, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 145, 157-62 (2008) [hereinafter
Amar, Legal Reasoning] (rejecting stare decisis except when there has been popular
ratification of unenumerated rights); Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against
Precedent, 17 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 23, 24 (1994) ("[T]he practice of following
precedent is not merely nonobligatory or a bad idea; it is affirmatively inconsistent with the
federal Constitution."); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of
Precedent, 22 Const. Comment. 289, 291 (2005) [hereinafter Paulsen, Corrupting
Influence] ("Stare decisis is unconstitutional, precisely to the extent that it yields
deviations from the correct interpretation of the Constitution . . . ." (emphasis omitted)).
But see Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not As Radical As
It Sounds, 22 Const. Comment. 257, 269 (2005) [hereinafter Barnett, Trumping
Precedent] (delineating certain categories in which stare decisis is appropriate and noting
there is "much room for the doctrine of precedent in originalism").
45. Lawson, supra note 44, at 26-28.
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choose the Constitution.4 6 In a similar vein, Professor Paulsen argues
that by allowing precedents to dictate results, stare decisis "corrupts and
undermines" any interpretive theory of the Constitution.4 7 These writers
are the target of Part IV, the final section of this Article.

Despite its attractiveness, I submit that Supremacy Clause textualism,
grounded as it is in originalism, must be rejected if offered as an adequate basis for reasoning about our existing constitutional practices. To
be sure, the reasons for so doing require careful elaboration, because,
after all, we are all (or at least most of us) textualists. That is, in thinking
about the process of constitutional interpretation, we take the text seriously. 4 8 But many Supremacy Clause textualists do more: They are fundamentalists. For them, originalism provides a currently acceptable theory of constitutional adjudication, and they insist that the Supremacy
Clause is a trump, a decisive factor in constitutional adjudication that (ordinarily) overrides every other consideration. 49 Few, if any, apparently
share my view that originalism cannot account for a considerable measure of the existing constitutional order.5 0
Focusing upon Professor Clark's arguments, particularly with respect
to federal common law, I submit, demonstrates the limits of Supremacy
Clause textualism (and, more generally, originalism) as a mode of constitutional understanding. This Article advances three main arguments.
First-Clarkbelieves that the Supremacy Clause should be read to
bar the creation of federal common law because its reference to "Laws"
meant only Acts of Congress. While I agree that, as an historical matter,
46. Id.
47. Paulsen, Corrupting Influence, supra note 44, at 290; see also Michael Stokes
Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?, 103 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 857, 913 (2009) [hereinafter Paulsen, Does the Constitution?] ("Stare decisis, if
understood as a doctrine requiring or permitting decisions contrary to the original public
meaning of the Constitution, is simply unconstitutional.").
48. Cf. Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional
Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 Geo. L.J. 1765, 1766 (1997) ("Most, if not all, of
us are . . . moderate originalists; we are interested in the framers' intent on a relatively
abstract level of generality." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
49. But see Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 128 S. Ct. 2578, 2592 (2008) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring, joined by Scalia, J.) (arguing stare decisis governs in absence of "sufficient
case . . . for revisiting [controlling] precedents"); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser
Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849, 861 (1989) [hereinafter Scalia, Lesser Evil] (acknowledging
that in some instances precedent will trump original understanding, notwithstanding
Supremacy Clause). Professor Ramsey at least formally leaves open the question of the
binding effect of original understanding. Ramsey, supra note 24, at 3-4. But the entire
tenor of his book radiates a belief that adherence to the original understanding of
presidential power is normatively appealing.
50. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88
Colum. L. Rev. 723, 727-29 (1988) [hereinafter Monaghan, Stare Decisis] (describing
significant departures from original understanding).
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. made in pursuance thereof' 5 1 referred only to Acts of Con-

52

gress, I reach that conclusion for reasons quite different from Clark's.
My emphasis is on the word "made" (which also appears in connection
with treaties). "General law," particularly the law merchant and the law
of nations, would not have been thought by the founding generation to
have been "made." It was, instead, "discovered."5 3 It is quite implausible
to think that the Supremacy Clause addressed this body of law at all, a
transcendental body of law that both state and federal courts alike applied when it was applicable to cases within their jurisdiction. Courts applied that law not because it was the product of a sovereign command,
but because it was understood at the time as simply what judges did. But
federal declarations of general law were not "supreme." The state courts
were entirely free to take a different view of the content of the relevant
general law. The modern conception of federal common law-judgemade law that binds both federal and state courts-simply did not exist
circa 1788. There was no "compromise" that made federal statutory law
obligatory, but not federal common law. The Supremacy Clause simply
did not deal with the latter.
Clark writes in the post-positivist reality, where our conception of
"law" requires that it be attached to some sovereign; but we cannot force
a new concept (federal common law) into a vessel (the Supremacy
Clause) that was created when that concept did not exist. This problem, I
believe, illustrates the broader difficulty with originalism in general: Far
too infrequently will one find a problem that the Founders actually contemplated and resolved. This means that in the modern world, a great
deal of constitutional law is a product of construction, not excavation.
Second-Supremacy Clause textualists cannot explain much of the
existing constitutional order. Clark, for example, cannot adequately account for the rise of the administrative state, which is characterized by
54
large quantities of administrative (not Article I, Section 7) lawmaking.
Nor, as I hope to show herein, can Clark provide a satisfactory account of
federal common law; indeed, he seems to believe that all federal common law, as we understand the term, is, in fact, really just interpretation
of "This Constitution."5 5
51. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
52. See, e.g., Clark, Role of Structure, supra note 12, at 701-03; Clark, Separation of
Powers, supra note 14, at 1332.
53. See infra Part III.
54. "In numeric terms, at least, the predominant source of federal law today is federal
agency rulemaking." Peter L. Strauss, The Perils of Theory, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1567,
1591 (2008) [hereinafter Strauss, Perils of Theory]. Professor Clark's response essentially
acknowledges the point. See Bradford R. Clark, The Procedural Safeguards of Federalism,
83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1681, 1701-03 (2008) [hereinafter Clark, Procedural Safeguards]
(discussing recent phenomenon of "broad agency preemption" and noting "absence of
aggressive judicial enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine"); see also infra Part II.A
(describing inability of Clark's theory to account for administrative lawmaking).
55. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
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Third-After examining some interpretive problems inherent in
Supremacy Clause textualism, I argue that important aspects of the intellectual world of the Founders have wholly vanished, rendering greatly
problematic any originalist understanding of the Supremacy Clause.
Moreover, even if the clear weight of the historical evidence supported it,
Supremacy Clause textualism could not supply a satisfying theory of our
contemporary constitutional order because it is inconsistent with deeply
entrenched practices and thus would destabilize far too much settled
doctrine.
The foregoing reasons lead me to the more specific conclusion that
at least for constitutional lawyers, the word "Laws" in the Supremacy
Clause must now be taken to include more than Acts of Congress; it must
encompass the commands of any authorized national lawmaker.5 6 That
is to say, "Laws" ought to include the commands of any institution whose
lawmaking authority has been recognized over time.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the shaky historical claims of Supremacy Clause textualists, particularly in assigning to the
Supremacy Clause an intentionally state-protective role while ignoring its
nationalist foundations. Part II describes Supremacy Clause textualism's
internal problems, such as its inability to account for administrative lawmaking and federal common law. Part III describes the lost world of the
founding generation and their understanding of the nature of "Laws,"
and it demonstrates that the general common law would not have been
understood by the Founders as having been "made." Finally, Part IV
moves to a different and more general matter. It challenges those
Supremacy Clause textualists who would deny the authoritative nature of
precedent in our constitutional system. In the process, it doubts that any
form of originalism, either theoretically or in practice, can provide an
adequate account of our practice of constitutional adjudication.

I. TEXTUALISM

AND THE

COMPLICATIONS OF

HISTORY

It may well be that the Framers did not specify with precision the
boundaries between national and state power, leaving room for future
contest.5 7 Wherever the lines are ultimately drawn, however, Clark insists
that the word "Laws" in the Supremacy Clause meant only an act of
56. Further, the Bicameralism and Presentment Clauses simply identify the
hierarchically supreme lawmaker in our ordinary constitutional order. A subsequent selfexecuting treaty could, of course, trump a prior act of Congress under the last in time rule.
See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Foreign Relations Law 461-67 (3d ed. 2009)
(discussing cases supporting last in time rule). The amendment process, needless to say, is
the ultimate source of lawmaking authority.
57. "In our complex system, presenting the rare and difficult scheme of one general
government, whose action extends over the whole, but which possesses only certain
enumerated powers; and of numerous State governments, which retain and exercise all
powers not delegated to the Union, contests respecting power must arise." Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 204-05 (1824).
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Congress. Clark's functional explanation for that conclusion is, in turn,
grounded in history. Putting aside, temporarily, the question of the
Founders' understanding of the meaning of "Laws," as used in the
Supremacy Clause, 58 I submit that Clark's broader historical account is
unsound.
Professor Clark is surely right to underpin his account by emphasizing the state-centered dimensions of the original constitutional landscape.5 9 I would nonetheless give a sharply different account of the relevant Supremacy Clause history and of the role of the Senate in our early
constitutional order. In particular, I wish to show that (a) Clark's newly
discovered emphasis on the constitutional protection provided to the
small states through equal representation in the Senate is misplaced; (b)
the Supremacy Clause was intended as a nationalizing, not a state-protective, clause; and (c) Clark's account of the Senate's importance in the
new constitutional order is thus quite incomplete. Shorn of these underpinnings, the appeal of Clark's Senate-oriented Supremacy Clause textualism is, I believe, considerably weakened.
A. Large States/Small States
Professor Clark rightly emphasizes the Constitutional Convention's
concern with the role of the Senate as protector of individual state inter60
ests. Madison observed that "the Senate represented the States alone."
The expectation seems to have been that the Senate would represent the
states in their "corporate" capacities, as distinctive polities in the new constitutional order.6 1 Professor Rakove writes that "[a]fterJuly 16 [the day
of the vote guaranteeing the small states equal representation in the Senate], no one could deny that the Senate was intended to embody the
equal sovereignty of the states and to protect their rights of government
62
against national encroachment."
But Clark's recent attraction to the Constitutional Convention's resolution of the big state/small state divide as support for Supremacy Clause
textualism cannot bear much weight. To be sure, that division played a
central role in the deliberations of the Convention, at which the funda58. See infra Part III.
59. See Monaghan, Stare Decisis, supra note 50, at 729 & n.38, 731 ("Circa 1789, the
internal orientation of the American people was state centered to a degree completely lost
to modern constitutional law scholars."); see also Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings
162-68, 201-02 (1996) (discussing Framers' conception of federal versus state power).
The pull of state-centered federalism clearly limited the possibilities for change even after
the Civil War. See Bernard Bailyn et al., The Great Republic 735-41 (1977) (discussing
possible options for Reconstruction).
60. 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 392 (Max Farrand ed., rev.
ed. 1966) [hereinafter Farrand, Records] (speaking in context of discussion of Treaty
Clause).
61. Rakove, supra note 59, at 170. Thus, the "people" of the several states were not
the direct beneficiaries of state representation in the Senate.
62. Id.
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mental question was how the new national government was to be organized. Two competing modes quickly emerged: proportional representation based upon state population, and state equality. Unsurprisingly, the
small states adamantly refused to see their role in the new national government swallowed up by the population-rich states.6 3 The Great Compromise ultimately resolved the issue by guaranteeing state equality in the
Senate. In his classic study, The Framing of the Constitution of the United
States, Professor Farrand writes:
This is the great compromise of the convention and of the constitution. None other is to be placed quite in comparison with
it. There have been many misunderstandings of it .

. .

. The

important feature of the compromise was that in the upper
house of the legislature each state should have an equal vote.
The principle of proportional representation in the lower house
was not a part of the compromise, although the details for carrying out that principle were involved. 6 4
Senate equality assured, the small states became "warmer and warmer advocates of a strong national government."6 5
By the end of the Constitutional Convention, however, many delegates recognized that the dangerous fault line was not between the large
and small states, but was sectional, with each region seeking security
against domination by other regions capable of capturing the national
government. Professor Farrand writes:
[I]n the first stages of the discussion of proportional representation the conflicting interests of east and west were more important than those of slave and free states. In colonial times, as
population increased and settlement extended into the back
63. The Delaware delegates were instructed that state equality was non-negotiable;
those instructions caused consternation among the large state delegates. Max Farrand,
The Framing of the Constitution of the United States 56 (1913) [hereinafter Farrand,
Framing]. As the Convention wore on, tension between the population-rich and
population-poor states increased. Id. at 84, 92-95, 119; see also Edward A. Purcell, Jr.,
Originalism, Federalism, and the American Constitutional Enterprise 25 (2007)
("Hamilton dismissed the position of the small states on [equal] representation [in the
Senate] as a simple 'contest for power . . . .'").
64. Farrand, Framing, supra note 63, at 105. Professor Farrand goes on to speak
about direct election of the Senate by the state legislators:
It cannot be too strongly insisted that whatever opinions were expressed in
debate, and whatever arguments were advanced for or against the election of the
members of the upper house by the state legislatures-and all sorts of proposals
of other methods were made and all sorts of opinions were expressed-they
should be interpreted with reference to the one question at issue, that of
proportional representation.
Id. at 112.
65. Id. at 113; see also Thornton Anderson, Creating the Constitution 73 & n.36
(1993) (noting impact of Great Compromise on attitude of small state delegates toward
strong national government). Unsurprisingly, the small states were also inclined to
strengthen the Senate's role. See Farrand, Framing, supra note 63, at 119 (considering
Appointments Clause).
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country, the conservative moneyed interests of the coast insisted
upon retaining the control of government in their own hands
and refused to grant to the interior counties the share in government to which their numbers of population entitled
them.... And this inequality was maintained in the state governments that were formed after the outbreak of the
Revolution.

. .

. As it had worked well there for the older por-

tions of the state to keep the power in their own hands, so now
in the United States, it was insisted, new states ought not to be
66
admitted on an equal footing with the old states.
Farrand himself perhaps understates the extent of North-South sectionalism at the time of the framing. He views that sectional clash entirely in terms of slavery, which, he argues, was not an important issue at
the Convention. 6 7 Even so, important sectional economic cleavages were

66. Farrand, Framing, supra note 63, at 108-09. Professor Farrand adds:
Gouverneur Morris was the champion of the commercial and propertied
interests, and when the great compromise was under discussion he declared in
favor of considering property as well as the number of inhabitants in
apportioning representatives. In explanation of his position he stated that he had
in mind the "range of new States which would soon be formed in the west," and
"he thought the rule of representation ought to be so fixed as to secure to the
Atlantic States a prevalence in the National Councils."
Id. at 109.
67. See id. at 110 ("In 1787, slavery was not the important question, it might be said
that it was not the moral question that it later became. The proceedings of the federal
convention did not become known until the slavery question had grown into the
paramount issue of the day."). Writing nearly a century later, Professor Howe agrees that
"the line between 'free' and 'slave' states was not yet sharply drawn [even by] 1815."
Daniel W. Howe, What Hath God Wrought 54 (2007). He adds: "Had short staple cotton
not emerged in the years after 1815 as an extremely profitable employment for slave labor,
finding a peaceful, acceptable resolution to the problem of emancipation might not have
been so difficult." Id. at 56. But the emerging cotton economy changed everything: "The
apologetic attitude toward slavery, common around 1815, soon began to be challenged by
a new justification for slavery: planter paternalism." Id. at 58; see also id. at 128
(discussing boom of cotton industry in South). "During the immediate postwar years of
1816 to 1820, cotton constituted 39 percent of U.S. exports; twenty years later the
proportion had increased to 59 percent . . . ." Id. at 131.

Thus, "[m]uch of Atlantic

civilization in the nineteenth century was built on the back of the enslaved field hand." Id.
at 132. Professor David Waldstreicher's brief study of slavery and the origins of the
Constitution does not alter this analysis. See David Waldstreicher, Slavery's Constitution:
From Revolution to Ratification (2009). He agrees that disturbance of slavery was not on
the Convention agenda, but the existence of slavery was an issue that had to be negotiated
around. Professor Waldstreicher describes how both slave and nonslave states tried to
leverage the issue of slavery to their advantage in creating a plan for representation and
taxation. Id. at 72-79, 89-90. He frames the Convention as an economic battle between
large and small states, in which slavery was frequently used by both sides to enhance their
bargaining positions. Thus, "[t]he business of slavery had not been left unfinished so
much as it had been leveraged." Id. at 103. All this said, however, the new Constitution
contained several provisions favorable to slavery. Paul Finkelman, The Constitution, the
Supreme Court, and History, 88 Tex. L. Rev. 353, 378-81 (2009) (book review).
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already apparent, as the conflict over such matters as navigation acts and
the taxation of imports and exports demonstrated.6 8
The Convention's concern with the distinction between large and
small states was stillborn by the time the Constitution emerged for ratification. Perhaps this is because the Convention had dealt with the issue so
adequately. Interestingly, however, The FederalistNo. 62 categorically denied that to the extent one could identify distinctive small state interests,
state equality in the Senate protected those interests.6 9 In the end, it
does not matter. The sectional divisions that emerged during the
Convention deliberations became a focal point in the ratification debates.
In The Federalist No. 5, Jay expressed fears that "the people of America
[will] divide themselves into three or four nations," and he decried those
who advocated "for three or four confederacies."7 0 In The FederalistNo. 6,
ConcerningDangersfrom War Between the States, Hamilton went even further
in expressing fears of sectional conflict.7 I By 1800, any straightforward
68. Indeed, Farrand himself recognized this fact when he addressed the resolution of
commerce-related matters: "New England and the middle states were the commercial and
shipping sections of the country . . .. [T]he south was a producing section." Farrand,
Framing, supra note 63, at 147-48. Describing the adjustments made by the Convention,
for importation of slaves and the proposed restrictions on navigation acts, he describes the
result as "one of the conspicuous and important compromises of the convention." Id. at
151.
69. Th7e Federalist No. 62 exhibits hostility to equal representation in the Senate,
treating it not as a matter to be justified "by the standard of theory" but as a matter of
"amity" and "mutual deference and concession which the peculiarity of our political
situation rendered indispensable." The Federalist No. 62 (James Madison), supra note 1,
at 342-43. To the extent that equality "is at once a constitutional recognition of that
portion of sovereignty remaining in the individual states, and an instrument for preserving
that residuary sovereignty," that interest was equally shared by the large states. Id. at 343.
Winding down this discussion, Madison wrote:
It must be acknowledged that this complicated check on legislation may, in some
instances, be injurious as well as beneficial; and that the peculiar defense which it
involves in favour of the smaller states, would be more rational, if any interests
common to them, and distinct from those of other states, would otherwise be
exposed to peculiar danger. But .. . the larger states will always be able, by their
power over the supplies, to defeat the unreasonable exertions of this prerogative
of the lesser states ....

Id. But Madison concluded on a more cheerful note: "[A]s the facility and excess of lawmaking seem to be the diseases to which our governments are most liable, it is not
impossible that this part of the constitution may be more convenient in practice, than it
appears to many in contemplation." Id.
70. The Federalist No. 5 (John Jay), supra note 1, at 26.
71. The Federalist No. 6 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 1, at 34 ("From this
summary of what has taken place in other countries, whose situations have borne the
nearest resemblance to our own, what reason can we have to confide in those reveries,
which would seduce us into the expectation of peace and cordiality between the members
of the present confederacy ... ?"). Consider, in light of the history of the Constitutional
Convention and the ratification debates, Professor Amar's astonishing claim that the small
states simultaneously agreed to a document that permitted the Constitution to be
amended by fifty percent plus one of a national "We the People." Akhil Reed Amar, The
Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 Colum. L.
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concern with a divide between large and small states had vanished from
the constitutional landscape. Neither Professors Elkins and McKitrick in
their The Age of Federalism nor Professor Wood in his recently published
The Empire of Liberty even mentions the topic. 7 2 But sharp sectional economic conflicts between North and South surfaced. The proper role of
the tariff, for example, quickly became a sectional issue,7 3 as did internal
improvements. 7 4
The constitutional text itself reflects sectionalism concerns.7 5 Article
V's amendment process was designed to ensure that the states-or, far
more accurately, regions-could be compelled to fuse no closer together
than the original document provided unless the rigors of Article V were
satisfied.7 6 In his Discourse, Calhoun expressed confidence that Article V
Rev. 457, 482 (1994). But see generally Henry Paul Monaghan, We the People[s], Original
Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 121 (1996)
[hereinafter Monaghan, We the People] (rejecting Amar's claim as lacking any historical
foundation).
72. Stanley Elkins & Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism 691-754 (1993); Gordon
Wood, The Empire of Liberty (2009) [hereinafter Wood, Empire]. Professor Wood's work
is a study of the United States from 1789 to 1815.
73. Interestingly, the tariff of 1816, enacted during the surge of nationalism after the
War of 1812, was strongly protective and was supported by many southern stalwarts,
including Madison and Calhoun. Howe, supra note 67, at 84-85. Further, "[tihe
landmark tariff. . . enacted on April 27, 1816 was candidly protectionist in its features." Id.
at 84. But as Caleb Nelson reminds us:
In the 1820s ... protective tariffs became a source of enormous sectional strife.
As Joseph Story wrote in 1833, the controversy over protective tariffs "agitates all
America, and marks the divisions of party by the strongest lines, both
geographical and political, which have ever been seen since the establishment of
the national government."
Caleb Nelson, Judicial Review of Legislative Purpose, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1784, 1799 (2008)
(quoting 2 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 520
(Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833)).
74. Howe, supra note 67, at 87-89; Wood, Empire, supra note 72, at 164-73.
75. One also ought to note the Convention's concern with strategically positioned
individual port states. See U.S. Const. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 2 (mandating that "all Duties, Imposts,
and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States"). In United States v. Ptasynski,
462 U.S. 74 (1983), the Court reviewed the history behind the Uniformity Clause. Its
purpose
was to cut off all undue preferences of one State over another in the regulation of
subjects affecting their common interests. Unless duties, imposts, and excises
were uniform, the grossest and most oppressive inequalities, vitally affecting the
pursuits and employments of the people of different States, might exist. The
agriculture, commerce, or manufactures of one State might be built up on the
ruins of those of another; and a combination of a few States in Congress might
secure a monopoly of certain branches of trade and business to themselves, to the
injury, if not to the destruction, of their less favored neighbors.
Id. at 81 (quoting I Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States
683 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 4th ed. 1873)).
76. Monaghan, We the People, supra note 71, at 143-45 ("Article V was thus a
compromise between two competing policies-the Constitution must possess a sensible
mechanism for change, but the terms of the union among the states were not to be readily
altered.").
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would protect the South from northern domination, and if it did not, he
elaborated, secession was the next step."
Regional considerations were also reflected in the Treaty Clause. Its
supermajority requirement was designed to ensure that the new national
government could not readily sacrifice any sectional interests. 7 8 This was
no idle concern. Western interests already feared that a potential treaty
with Spain would close the port of New Orleans to gain advantage for
northern commercial interests in their dealings with Spain.7 9 (Interestingly, use of the Treaty Clause to displace otherwise applicable state-and
federal-law has now fallen into disfavor especially among political conservatives, because some see the process as suffering from severe legitimacy defects.8 0 ) It was sectionalism, then, more so than the large/small
state divide, that animated the debates at the time of the Convention and
ratification.
B. The Supremacy Clause
The history of "Our Federalism"' from 1789 to 1865 (and beyond)
is the history of the impact of the centrifugal effects of sectionalism on
the emerging American national polity.8 2 While the substitution of sectionalism for Clark's large state/small state emphasis reorients the historical focus, it does not dispose of his central claim: Regions, after all, are
77. Id. at 161 (citing John C. Calhoun, A Discourse on the Constitution and
Government of the United States, in A Disquisition on Government and a Discourse on the
Constitution and Government of the United States 111, 158 (Richard K Cralle ed., 1968)).
78. Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties End: The Past, Present, and Future of International
Lawmaking in the United States, 117 Yale L.J. 1236, 1281-83 (2008) [hereinafter
Hathaway, Treaties End].
79. Id. at 1282-83.
80. For an excellent critical survey, see Laura Morancheck Hussain, Note, Enforcing
the Treaty Rights of Aliens, 117Yale L.J. 680, 700 (2008) ("[T]he treaty power today tends
to provoke anxieties about the role of the House . . . in lawmaking, the nation's
commitment to constitutional language as the sole exposition of fundamental individual
rights, the appropriate roles of the states ... within our constitutional system, and the
judiciary's proper role in foreign affairs."). In part, objections to giving immediate
domestic effect reflect more fundamental misgivings about giving domestic effect to any
not wholly "American"-generated legal principles. For a recent review of that controversy,
see Catherine Powell, Tinkering with Torture in the Aftermath of Hamdan: Testing the
Relationship Between Internationalism and Constitutionalism, 40 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol.
723, 732-44, 754-91 (2009). For an extended argument, on functional grounds, that the
treaty process has outlived its historical justifications and should be replaced by
congressional-executive agreements, see Hathaway, Treaties End, supra note 78. In Oona
A. Hathaway, Presidential Power over International Law: Restoring the Balance, 119 Yale
L.J. 140 (2009), Professor Hathaway proposes statutory reforms to curb the President's
dominance of the process of international lawmaking agreements.
81. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1970).
82. For recent historical studies portraying the divisive nature of sectionalism in the
United States before the Civil War, see 1 William W. Freehling, The Road to Disunion
(1990); 2 William W. Freehling, The Road to Disunion (2007); Howe, supra note 67, at
367-73. For a splendid earlier account, see David M. Potter, The Impending Crisis:
1848-1861 (1976).
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composed of states, and regional protection thus found institutional expression in the Senate. And the three-fifths rule of Article I, Section 2,
which distorted southern representation in both the Electoral College
and the House of Representatives, provided (temporarily at least) additional vital protection for the South.8 3
Recently, Clark has emphasized that the Supremacy Clause was added but a day after the Great Compromise.8 4 His suggestion that the
Clause was designed to protect state sovereignty is, however, quite unconvincing.8 5 Though surely state-centered in important regards, the
Constitution was, after all, intended to create an effective national government, and the Supremacy Clause was central to that endeavor. Resolution 14 of the Virginia Plan, which after considerable revamping
formed the basis of the Constitution, contained a weak form of the
Supremacy Clause.8 6 No doubt this was because the Virginia Plan also
granted the national legislature a power to "negative" all state legislation
"contravening in the opinion of the National legislature the articles of
Union."8 7 (Madison was very strongly attached to the negative, which he
viewed as "perhaps the central pillar in his vision of a new national government"; indeed, he supported a "universal" negative on all state
laws. 8 8 ) Resolution 6 of the New Jersey plan, however, advanced by the
small states at the height of the large state/small state tension, contained
a Supremacy Clause bearing a strong family resemblance to the present
Clause.8 9
83. The representation distortion worked by the three-fifths rule resulted in southern
control of the presidency for a large part of the first half of the nineteenth century. Howe,
supra note 67, at 61, 69, 150, 208, 282; see also id. at 352 (describing importance of slave
state representation in passing Indian Removal Bill). Eventually, however, the South fell
further and further behind the North in terms of population, and "looked to preserve
sectional equality in the Senate, where each state had two members regardless of
population." Id. at 150; see also id. at 767-78 (describing Senate's blocking of Wilmot
Proviso, which would have prohibited slavery in territories acquired in Mexican War).
84. Clark, Constitutional Compromise, supra note 13, at 1430. For a detailed account
of the historical origins of the Supremacy Clause, see Christopher R. Drahozal, The
Supremacy Clause 3-65 (2004), see also Robert H. Birkby, Politics of Accommodation:
The Origin of the Supremacy Clause, 19 W. Pol. Q. 123 (1966).
85. Clark writes:
The Supremacy Clause magnifies the significance of the Senate to the federalstate balance by conferring the status of the supreme Law of the Land only on
sources of law adopted with the participation and assent of the Senate or the
states themselves-that is, the Constitution, Laws, and Treaties of the United
States.
Clark, Constitutional Compromise, supra note 13, at 1432 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
86. It read: "Resd. that the Legislative Executive &Judiciary powers within the several
States ought to be bound by oath to support the articles of Union." I Farrand, Records,
supra note 60, at 22.
87. Id. at 21 (discussing Resolution 6).
88. Drahozal, supra note 84, at 13-16, 20.
89. It read:
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Once state equality in the Senate was achieved, the states rebelled at
giving Congress a general veto over state laws.9 0 A different mechanism
was necessary to ensure national, not state, sovereignty in the areas of
authority committed to the national government; that mechanism was
the Supremacy Clause. That the Clause was designed to ensure lawful
national supremacy is quite apparent from the text itself. It provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be
the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby; any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.9 1
History confirms what the text makes plain. Luther Martin introduced a version of the Supremacy Clause nearly identical to Resolution 6
on the same day that another of Madison's efforts to give Congress a negative over state laws failed.9 2 The Clause was intended to make clear that
courts (not Congress) would ensure that valid federal law would prevail
over contrary state law: "[I]t was [now] evident that the authority of the
national government would depend on judicial enforcement."9 3 "Quietly
and uncontroversially," writes Professor Rakove, "a clause which was origiResolved that all Acts of the United States in Congress made by virtue and in
pursuance of the powers hereby and by the articles of confederation vested in
them, and all Treaties made and ratified under the authority of the United States
shall be the supreme law of the respective States so far forth as those Acts or
Treaties shall relate to the said States or their Citizens, and that the Judiciary of
the several States shall be bound thereby in their decisions, any thing in the
respective laws of the Individual States to the contrary notwithstanding.
Farrand, Framing, supra note 63, at 232. On the differences between this version and the
present Supremacy Clause, see Drahozal, supra note 84, at 17; infra note 92. For the
various iterations of the Supremacy Clause, see Drahozal, supra note 84, at 69-70.
90. Drahozal, supra note 84, at 19.
91. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
92. Neither the New Jersey Plan nor Martin's resolution mentioned "this
Constitution" as part of the "supreme law." See Anderson, supra note 65, at 80-81
(discussing Martin's resolution and connection between failure to adopt legislative
negative and adoption of Supremacy Clause); Drahozal, supra note 84, at 21 (explaining
Martin's reasoning for proposed resolution); Farrand, Framing, supra note 63, at 229-32
(reproducing New Jersey Plan). Professor Birkby writes:
Martin's version was clearly intended to establish the supremacy of national laws
over state laws and nothing more. A reading of the plain words of his resolution
demonstrates that the national Constitution of its own force was not intended to
inhibit the actions of the state legislatures, for the Constitution is not declared to
be a part of the supreme law. Nor were state constitutions and bills of rights to be
affected by either the Constitution or national laws. In short, the only control
over state action that Martin intended to grant was provision for the resolution of
a direct conflict between national and state laws in favor of national action. In
resolving such conflicts Martin also intended that the initial steps be taken in state
courts. He was unwilling to accept the establishment of inferior federal tribunals.
Birkby, supra note 84, at 130.
93. Rakove, supra note 59, at 173. Farrand similarly emphasizes the importance of
the Supremacy Clause at the conclusion of his book: "[T]he significance [of the
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nally offered as a weak alternative to the negative on state laws had been
transformed into a potentially powerful basis for national supremacy."9 4
The Supremacy Clause was not a product of compromise in favor of
state interests. Professor Birkby notes that no evidence exists that replacing the congressional negative with the Supremacy Clause was one of the
concessions given to the small states. He writes:
If this is the case, it is one of the best kept secrets of the
Convention. There is no indication in the debates or in letters
written then or later by key delegates that abandonment of the
legislative negative was a part of the price exacted by the small
states. It is unreasonable to assume that the delegates agreed
that this one compromise should be shrouded in secrecy and
never revealed. 95
During the ratification debates, the Supremacy Clause was seen by
friend and foe alike as an instrument of national authority. Professor
Drahozal writes:
The Supremacy Clause was prominent in the state debates on
ratification, in newspapers and pamphlets as well as in the state
ratifying conventions themselves. According to Alexander
Hamilton in Federalist No. 33, the Supremacy Clause (along
with the Necessary and Proper Clause) were "the sources of
much virulent invective and petulant declamation against the
proposed Constitution."9 6
He adds that "[t]he Anti-Federalists' fundamental criticism of the
Supremacy Clause was that it made the national government too powerful
and thus was too great an infringement on state sovereignty."9 7 Professor
Drahozal groups the general objections as the destruction of state autonomy, interference with the rights secured by states' bills of rights, and the
capacity of treaties to override even state constitutions." Writing in a
similar vein, Professor Birkby states:
When the proposed Constitution was debated in the state ratifying conventions, however, serious questions were raised concerning the Supremacy Clause. Most of the objections centered
on the contention that the clause would prove to be the instrument for the absorption of the states by the central government.
The danger was thought to come from the combined operation
of the supremacy clause and the tax power, or the necessary and
proper clause, or the jurisdiction of the federal courts.9 9
Constitution] is that it was a law, and as such was enforceable in the courts." Farrand,
Framing, supra note 63, at 209.
94. Rakove, supra note 59, at 174.
95. Birkby, supra note 84, at 134.
96. Drahozal, supra note 84, at 25 (quoting Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the
Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S. Car. L. Rev. 967, 969 n.9 (2002)).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 25-26.
99. Birkby, supra note 84, at 131.
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From the standpoint of logic, it could of course be argued that the
Supremacy Clause was surplusage, as Hamilton insisted. 0 0 The grants of
power to Congress in Article I and the restrictions imposed therein on
the states necessarily implied that these provisions were the "supreme
Law of the Land."' 0 But here, as elsewhere, "a page of history is worth a
volume of logic." 10 2 The problematic status of the Articles of
Confederation as "law" was real. The purpose of the Supremacy Clause
was to make clear the legal authority of the new national government.
Professor Philip Hamburger's splendid new work, Law and JudicialDuty,
puts the matter clearly:
It is well known that the Articles of Confederation left
Congress without some essential powers....
The problem, however, was not merely one of inadequate
powers but more basically a question of whether the Articles of
Confederation or any congressional enactment amounted to the
law of the land. Rather than a constitution with authority from
the people of the American states, the Articles were a "league of
friendship" among the states, and although the states "delegated" some of their power to Congress through the Articles, it
was far from obvious that they thereby made the Articles a law.
Nor was it apparent that the states gave Congress a lawmaking
power. Congress had no authority from the people, and from
the states it only had authority to make "determinations." This
was less than a lawmaking power, and Congress therefore
promulgated its law-like determinations under the rubric of "ordinances"-the traditional label for acts without the legitimacy
of the law of the land.
In fact, instead of imposing any legal obligation, Article
XIII of the Articles of Confederation only required a contractual
commitment from the states: "Every state shall abide by the determinations of the united states in congress assembled, on all
questions which by this confederation are submitted to them.
100. Hamilton insisted that the Clause was "only declaratory of a truth, which would
have resulted by necessary and unavoidable implication from the very act of constituting a
federal government, and vesting it with certain specified powers." The Federalist No. 33
(Alexander Hamilton), supra note 1, at 172. This is true except insofar as the Supremacy
Clause protected treaties entered into during the Articles of Confederation.
101. See Bob Eckhardt & Charles L. Black, Jr., The Tides of Power 5 (1976). As
Representative Eckhardt notes:
Even the Article VI "[S]upremacy [C]lause," of which so much is made, is plainly
unnecessary, because nobody in his right mind could read Article I and come to
any conclusion other than that federal law is to be supreme. There is language in
Article I which says that the States can't do this, that, or the other-language that
could not possibly occur in an instrument whose underlying assumption was not
the supremacy of national law. But even if these particular passages weren't
there, it would be rather preposterous to think that a state law could take
precedence over a power, such as the commerce power, granted to and exercised
by the national Congress.
Id.
102. N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (Holmes, J.).
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And the Articles of this confederation shall be inviolably observed by every state." Just how different this was from the obligation of law became evident when the delegates to Congress
closed the Articles with the fulsome declaration that "we do further solemnly plight and engage the faith of our respective constituents" that "they shall abide by the determinations of the
United States in Congress assembled, on all questions, which by
the said Confederation are submitted to them," and that "the
Articles thereof shall be inviolably observed by the States we respectively represent." The Articles and the determinations of
the United States in Congress had to be plighted as a matter of
faith precisely because they lacked the obligation of law.103
That the Supremacy Clause was designed to protect national, not
state, interests is particularly evident with respect to treaties. States' failure to honor treaties, particularly the 1783 Treaty of Paris, was one of the
animating causes of the Constitutional Convention, 0 4 and it was expected that treaties made by the new national government would be
wholly self-executing. That is to say that, upon ratification, they would
immediately operate as internal law.1 0 5
C. Overstatingthe Senate's Protective Role
Furthermore, Professor Clark overstates the protective role of the
Senate in the constitutional structure that emerged from the Convention.
Professor Riker long ago observed that the states, qua states, had never
been able to affirmatively direct national policy through the Senate. He
103. Philip Hamburger, Law and Judicial Duty 587-88 (2008) (citations omitted). I
should note here, however, that The Federalist No. 40 accords a somewhat more law-like
status to the Articles of Confederation. See The Federalist No. 40 (James Madison), supra
note 1, at 218-19 (noting instances in which "those [powers] of the existing government
act immediately on individuals").
104. Henry Paul Monaghan, Article III and Supranational Judicial Review, 107
Colum. L. Rev. 833, 853 & n.112 (2007). Professor Hamburger writes:
Many of the states took offense at the suggestion that the Treaty was binding as
law. Southerners recalled that treaties had not previously been binding as law;
they also generally opposed any return of Tory lands and any suggestion that
Americans had to repay British perfidy with cash. Southern states therefore
typically barred British subjects from recovering their property or collecting their
debts, and although the most dramatic southern departures from the Treaty were
legislative, the most persistent were judicial. The North Carolina judges, for
example, regularly denied that the Treaty was part of the law of the land. The
sole exception was when they banished the Tories Brice and McNeil and to this
end "declared that the treaty of peace was the law of the land." Otherwise, the
North Carolina judges, like many other southern judges, refused to acknowledge
that the Treaty was legally binding. The British responded to such discrimination
by refusing to relinquish the posts they held along the Canadian border, thus
hinting that America might lose the territories it had secured through the Treaty
of Paris.
Hamburger, supra note 103, at 591-92 (citations omitted).
105. Medellfn v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1377-80 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(collecting authorities); see also infra Part II.D.1.
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attributes this in significant part to the important structural differences
between the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution. The Articles
of Confederation permitted recall of state representatives at any time,
and thus state legislatures could effectively issue binding instructions.10 6
Not surprisingly, a sharp dispute immediately arose over whether such
instructions were binding under the new Constitution. Many senators ignored them, preferring to face the political consequences of a future
election by the state legislature, 10 7 and by the end of the Jacksonian era,
instructions ceased to be a matter of importance. 08 I believe that the
central reason why the pre-Civil War Senate could not affirmatively direct
national policy was because the states were fractured along sectional lines.
As a result of this fracture, the Senate played an essentially negative role
in the early American constitutional order: protecting regional interests.
While the Senate's state-protective role was important in our early
constitutional history, the states had other means by which to secure
themselves against national oppression.1 0 9 The FederalistNo. 62, for example, argued that state security against national oppression was to be secured through other mechanisms: in the states themselves through their
ability to compete for the affections of the people, and in every state's
ability to raise a hue and cry against national excesses. 110 Moreover, the
Senate's state-protective function was institutionally compromised at the
1 11
very outset by allowing senators to vote as individuals, not as states.
112
no
The members of the Convention did not see it that way, however,
legislaon
the
state
dependence
senators'
electoral
doubt because of the
tures. Nonetheless, the consequences of the Convention's decision
quickly appeared. Professor Hathaway tells us that the Jay Treaty, which
106. William H. Riker, The Senate and American Federalism, 49 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.
452, 456 (1955).
107. Id. at 457. On occasion, the device of a "forced" resignation of the disobeying
senators was unsuccessful. Id. at 458-60.
108. See id. at 460-61 ("Jackson's use of instructions was ... the beginning of their
obsolescence.").
109. See Note, Defending Federalism: Realizing Publius's Vision, 122 Harv. L. Rev.
745, 746 (2008) (-[T]he states would keep the national government honest by
outcompeting it for the affections of 'the people."').
110. Id.; see also The Federalist No. 17 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 1, at 92-93
(discussing affection of people for their states); The Federalist No. 26 (Alexander
Hamilton), supra note 1, at 143 (discussing state vigilance); supra note 69 (discussing The
Federalist No. 62).
111. See Rakove, supra note 59, at 170 ("If the Senate represented states in their
corporate capacity, it was hardly consistent to allow senators to vote as individuals rather
than as a delegation."). Luther Martin objected on that ground. Id. at 171. "Equally
revealing," Rakove states, "was the treatment of the payment of senatorial salaries. . . .
A chorus of delegates ...
Oliver Ellsworth . . . proposed restoring national payment ....
echoed his position, while again only Martin protested." Id. Professor Rakove concludes
that "[t]he Senate itself would embody the mixed character of the Constitution: It would
be 'federal' in origin but 'national' in orientation, somehow protecting state sovereignty
and the national interest simultaneously." Id.
112. Farrand, Framing, supra note 63, at 121-22.
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the Senate approved twenty to ten, would have failed had voting occurred
on a state-by-state basis. 1 3 Finally, of course, the Senate's protective role
was further eroded by the rise of movements toward the popular election
of senators through the "public canvass" and other such mechanisms, all
of which ultimately culminated in the Seventeenth Amendment.' 1 4 Any
adequate theory of constitutional adjudication must make sense of this
development.
D. The ConstitutionalText and the Present
Clark's historical design account of the Supremacy Clause' 15 seems
to me largely unconvincing, but one must acknowledge the constitutional
text itself. Surely, on first reading, Clark's understanding of the
Supremacy Clause is intuitively appealing, despite my criticisms. One can
imagine, at the founding, some or many members of the populace concluding in essence that, "I, of course, don't know exactly what went on at
the Convention. However, the Constitution certainly strengthens the national government's authority against the states, but only in the instances
specified in Article VI." Thus, even a nation-centered Supremacy Clause
that can be seen as indirectly protecting state interests could draw additional support from the manner in which proponents of both the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights presented those documents to the ratifiers. The states were, after all, intended and expected to play a significant role in the new legal order. Moreover, acknowledging a state-protective gloss on the Supremacy Clause, both presentations emphasized the
limited nature of the powers given to the new national government.1 1 6
Against this background, one can understand the current appeal of
Supremacy Clause textualism (particularly in reading "Laws" as referring
only to Acts of Congress) and of the notion of the constitutional text as
withstanding intervening developments such as judicial precedent.
These understandings, however, encounter sharp difficulties, apart from
the historical inadequacies I have just addressed. The next Part examines
some of the problems facing Supremacy Clause textualists, especially the
status of federal common law. As we shall see, these problems, particularly the necessity of explaining the current status of federal common
lawmaking, ultimately force Clark to recast federal common law as constitutional interpretation.
113. Hathaway, Treaties End, supra note 78, at 1284 n.121.
114. Riker, supra note 106, at 463-69.
115. See supra notes 11-23 and accompanying text.
116. For a recent and elaborate demonstration of this point, see Kurt T. Lash, The
Original Meaning of an Omission: The Tenth Amendment, Popular Sovereignty and
"Expressly" Delegated Power, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1889, 1895 (2008) (noting early
concerns that "the Constitution delegated unchecked authority into the hands of the
federal government" and "response . . . that Congress would have only expressly
enumerated powers"), Such an interpretation might be reinforced by the text of the First
Amendment ("Congress shall make no law. . . ."), which suggests that Congress alone can
enact law. See U.S. Const. amend. I.
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Examined up close, Supremacy Clause textualism encounters numerous difficulties, some large, some small. These difficulties arise when
Supremacy Clause textualists attempt to account for the rise of administrative lawmaking in the modern state, the current status of federal common law, and the operation of other constitutional texts, such as the
Treaty Clause and the Take Care Clause. I address each of these
problems in turn.
A. The Problem of Administrative Lawmaking
More striking than the transformation in "Our Federalism" is the extent to which the 1789 version of separation of powers gave way to the
necessities of the new administrative and bureaucratic order. The bestknown casualty here is the Lockean axiom that the grant of legislative
power is only to make laws, not to make other legislators, and thus
17
Congress cannot delegate legislative power.'
Professor Clark's reading of the Supremacy Clause cannot be reconciled with the rise of the modern administrative state, the dominant characteristic of which is administrative-not Article I, Section 7-lawmaking.
Clark confronts that reality, rather than, as some do, denying that agencies exercise legislative power.1 18 His only response is that the nondelegation doctrine cannot be enforced, except at the margins.1 19 Massive
delegations must be sustained, he says, because no principled line exists
between agency interpretation (which is permissible) and agency lawmak-

117. Monaghan, Stare Decisis, supra note 50, at 735 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citingJohn Locke, Of Civil Government, Second Treatise § 141, at 118 (Gateway
7th prtg. 1968) (1690)). More generally, "it has become increasingly difficult to relate
governmental structures and powers to the original Constitution." Robert C. Palmer, The
Federal Common Law of Crime, 4 Law & Hist. Rev. 267, 269 (1986).
118. Although agency lawmaking is quite indistinguishable from congressional
lawmaking so far as the citizen is concerned, Professors Posner and Vermeule argue that it
is not part of Article I's "legislative Powers." Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring
the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1721, 1723 (2002). That language, they
assert, refers only to the power to enact statutes. Id. Professor Thomas Merrill rightly
criticizes that view as an "idiosyncratic[ally]" narrow definition of "legislative" power,
observing that "[t]here is no support in decisional law" for such a restricted definition, and
further observing that "[tihe possibility seems to never have occurred to anyone in a
context in which it would have decisional significance." Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking
Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 Colum. L. Rev.
2097, 2108-09, 2125 (2004) [hereinafter Merrill, Rethinking]; see also id. at 2165 (arguing
"the nondelegation doctrine . . . should be rejected" and Article I, Section 1 does not
preclude delegation of legislative authority).
119. Clark cites two decisions in which he claims that the nondelegation principle was
enforced. See Clark, Procedural Safeguards, supra note 54, at 1702 (citing Clinton v. City
of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998), and INS v. Chada, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)).
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ing (which is not).120 There surely is force to this argument.12 1 Still,
clear ("I know it when I see it") cases of agency "lawmaking" currently
exist in the multitude of "do what you think best" delegations.12 2 Yet,
while piously avowing that legislative power cannot be delegated, 12 3 the
Supreme Court invariably upholds such "delegations" under the flaccid
"intelligible principle" doctrine:12 4 "[W]e have 'almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy
judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law.'"125
The recent congressional efforts to end the financial crisis show how
empty the nondelegation "prohibition" is.' 2 6
120. See id. ("[T] here is no bright line, judicially administrable test for distinguishing
(permissible) law execution from (impermissible) lawmaking."). By contrast, both
Professor Merrill and Professor Cass Sunstein believe that the text of Article I, Section 1
simply does not preclude delegation of legislative power. Merrill, Rethinking, supra note
118, at 2165; Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 315, 322 (2000).
This argument, however, ignores important background assumptions governing the
original meaning of the constitutional text. See supra note 117 and accompanying text
(noting Lockean "axiom" that legislators could not make other legislators by delegating
power). Early decisions reflect the nondelegation principle. See, e.g., Wayman v.
Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43-46 (1825) ("The line has not been exactly drawn
which separates those important subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the
legislature itself, from those of less interest, in which a general provision may be made, and
power given to those who are to act under such general provisions . . . .").

Thomas

Cooley's influential nineteenth-century work states that "[o]ne of the settled maxims in
constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be
delegated by that department to any other body or authority." Thomas M. Cooley, A
Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest upon the Legislative Power of the
States of the American Union 163 (Victor H. Lane ed., 7th ed. 1903) (1868).
121. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional
Meaning, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1275 (2006). Professor Fallon's "permissible disparity thesis"
recognizes that "it is sometimes acceptable for courts to allow a gap to open between the
Constitution's meaning and the doctrines through which judges implement constitutional
guarantees." Id. at 1278-79 (internal quotation marks omitted). But on occasion, judgemade doctrine cannot or should not be fashioned. See id. at 1322-31 (suggesting
framework for analyzing when courts can and should allow gap between Constitution's
meaning and judicial application).
122. For example, the Court has upheld statutes that instruct agencies to regulate on
the basis of "public interest, convenience, or necessity," Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States,
319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943) (internal quotation marks omitted), to set "fair and equitable"
prices, Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 427 (1944), or to set ambient air quality
standards that are "requisite to protect the public health," Whitman v. Am. Trucking
Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 473 (2001) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
123. Speaking of Article I, Section 1, the Whitman Court wrote: "This text permits no
delegation of those powers." 531 U.S. at 472 (citation omitted); see also, e.g., Touby v.
United States, 500 U.S. 160, 165 (1991) ("Congress may not constitutionally delegate its
legislative power to another branch of Government.").
124. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 472-75.
125. Id. at 474-75 (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989)
(Scalia, J., dissenting)).
126. See John Schwartz, Some Ask if Bailout Is Unconstitutional, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16,
2009, at A16 (considering constitutionality of congressional delegation). A caveat is in
order here: On the whole, the TARP and other federal interventions do not sharply
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This Article focuses on Clark's views of the Supremacy Clause as providing an adequate theory of constitutional adjudication. Even if one
were to fully accept Clark's point as to the limits of the judicial process,
we are left in an uncomfortable position: For a very long time, then,
Congress and the President have been acting illegitimately in sanctioning
such delegations.
B. The Problem of Federal Common Law
Clark's thesis faces another formidable issue, one that I believe also
demonstrates Supremacy Clause textualism's inadequacy as a premise for
constitutional adjudication. Although Hart and Wechsler state that "[n]o
one today would seriously dispute that the body of federal law includes
judge-made law,"12 7 Clark's textualist reading of Article I, Section 7 and
the Supremacy Clause seemingly requires rejection of any federal common law, unless congressionally authorized. Yet he and other Supremacy
Clause textualists shy away from explicitly avowing any such sweeping
conclusion.12
There is, of course, considerable disagreement over the appropriate
sphere for judicially fashioned federal common law absent statutory delegation. The relatively freewheeling era of federal judicial lawmaking
(akin to that of a state common law court12 9 ) to "fill in the gaps" in a
federal statutory regime, sanctioned by such eminent figures as Justice
Jackson and Judge Friendly,13 0 is long gone.1 31 Most writers now posit a
implicate "private rights," the protection of which might be seen as the central concern of
the nondelegation doctrine.
127. Hart and Wechsler, Sixth Edition, supra note 5, at 607.
128. See Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation,
144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1245, 1250-51 (1996) [hereinafter Clark, Federal Common Law]
(declining to embrace view that federal common lawmaking is wholly limitless or wholly
illegitimate, instead offering "reconceptualization" based on constitutional preemption
and separation of powers); see also Bellia & Clark, supra note 11, at 9 (carefully avoiding
overt rejection of all federal common law, recognizing "[ilt is tempting simply to
characterize the Court's practice as applying 'federal common law' . . . [but] [t]his
characterization ... is both anachronistic and too simplistic. Rather than devising its own
rules of decision out of whole cloth in cases like Sabbatino, the Court has applied
constitutionally derived rules of decision").
129. See generally Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century:
Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 5-11 (1995)
(detailing state courts' role in shaping social policy).
130. D'Oench, Duhne & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 472 (1942) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) ("Federal common law implements the federal Constitution and statutes, and
is conditioned by them. Within these limits, federal courts are free to apply the traditional
common-law technique of decision and to draw upon all the sources of the common
law. . . ." (citation omitted)); HenryJ. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal
Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 383, 422 (1964). I confess that I would align myself with
these judges.
131. In Danforth v. Minnesota, the Court wrote in passing: "[T]here are federal
interests that occasionally justify this Court's development of common-law rules of federal
law. . . ." 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1046 (2008) (citation omitted). The Court cited Boyle v. United
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narrower sphere for judge-made common law.' 3 2 An influential work,
written long ago by Professor Alfred Hill, argued that federal common
lawmaking is rightly restricted to particular federal "enclaves," in which
state lawmaking has been constitutionally preempted: interstate controversies, admiralty, the proprietary transactions of the United States, and
international relations.1 33 Following, modifying, and deepening Hill's
thesis, Clark advances a fundamentally similar claim.' 3 4 Other positions
exist, of course. Most prominent is the claim in judicial opinions and
academic commentary that courts may fashion a federal common law
rule if federal statutory law preempts state law.135
Technologies Corp., where Justice Scalia posited uniquely federal interests and conflicting
state law as a basis for fashioning federal common law. 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988).
132. See, e.g., Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law,
99 Harv. L. Rev. 881, 887 (1986) (stating Court must "point to a federal enactment,
constitutional or statutory, that it interprets as authorizing the federal common law rule").
Professor Weinberg, however, is a notable exception. She holds a view even more
expansive than that of Justice Jackson and Judge Friendly. According to Weinberg,
"judicial process is sufficiently similar in all cases to make unnecessary . . . a separate
category for 'constitutional interpretation.'" Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83
Nw. U. L. Rev. 805, 807 (1989). This would make the judicial power to displace state law
coextensive with the legislative power to do so and would thus contravene the current
understanding of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See infra notes
141-143 and accompanying text.
133. Alfred Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional
Preemption, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 1024, 1065-66 (1967) [hereinafter Hill, Constitutional
Preemption]. For Professor Hill, the very silence of Congress "is precisely what calls upon
[courts] to speak." Id. at 1042. As Hart and Wechsler point out, Professor Hill has a
capacious view of what legitimately counts as statutory "interpretation." Richard Fallon et
al., Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and The Federal System 696-97 (5th ed.
2003) [hereinafter Hart and Wechsler, Fifth Edition].
134. See Clark, Federal Common Law, supra note 128; see also Hart and Wechsler,
Fifth Edition, supra note 133, at 697 n.3 (linking Clark's views to those of Professor Hill).
135. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 504 (noting existence of areas "so committed by the
Constitution and laws of the United States to federal control that state law is pre-empted
and replaced, where necessary, by federal law of a content prescribed (absent explicit
statutory directive) by the courts"); Ernest A. Young, Preemption and Federal Common
Law, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1639, 1660, 1664-65 (2008) ("The power to make federal
common law comes, if it exists at all, from the existence of a conflict between state law and
some preexisting federal policy, and the resulting imperative that state law must give way
under the Supremacy Clause."). Professor Merrill, for example, believes that federal
common law is appropriate when "either ... Congress has delegated lawmaking power to
courts, or . . . it is necessary to replace state law with federal law in order to preserve a
provision of enacted law." Thomas W. Merrill, The Judicial Prerogative, 12 Pace L. Rev.
327, 330-31 (1992). Merrill, in contrast to Hill, believes that judicial lawmaking in
admiralty and in interstate disputes results from a judicial conclusion that the statutory
jurisdictional grants would be undermined if state law were applied. Id. at 347-48. By
contrast, other writers believe that state law is displaced because of the structure and
relationships that are established by the Constitution or federal statutes, rather than from
jurisdictional grants, whether constitutional or statutory. See Hart and Wechsler, Sixth
Edition, supra note 5, at 741, 743-44 (criticizing reliance on jurisdictional statutes). And,
of course, there are numerous disputes as to whether the enclave preemption theory,
particularly in maritime law, is an appropriate source for displacing state law. Id. at 647.
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My purpose here is not to wade into these thorny disputes. (I would,
however, note as an aside that far more federal common law exists than
the currently restrictive theories can account for; ERISA, for example, is
soaked in a background federal common law of trusts. 36 ) For me, what
is noteworthy is that, Clark aside, none of the writers (so far as I am
aware), or (more importantly) the Court's decisions, focus upon the text
of Article I, Section 7 or the Supremacy Clause in addressing the propriety of federal common lawmaking. Questions of legitimacy are invariably
framed in more general separation of powers and federalism terms.' 3 7
Consider Swift v. Tyson.' 38 For reasons to be discussed in Part III,
federal courts enforced their understanding of the law merchant as "general law" without anyone objecting that Article I, Section 7 or the
Supremacy Clause had been transgressed.13 9 Extension of Swift to ordinary contract and tort law, 140 however, meant that from our perspective
the federal judicial power to "displace" state substantive law was clearly
greater than congressional power to do S0.141 At least under current understandings, no sound doctrine of separation of powers could countenance such a result.' 42 When congressional legislative power took on a
136. For recent examples, see Kennedy v. Plan Adm'r for Dupont Say. & Inv. Plan,
129 S. Ct. 865, 871 (2009); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343, 2347 (2008); see
also Semtek Int'l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508 (2001) ("In short,
federal common law governs the claim-preclusive effect of a dismissal by a federal court
sitting in diversity."); Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 675 (1965) (arising in context of
escheat law).
137. See, e.g., Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 743 (1979) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (notingjudicial creation of private right of action "allows the Judicial Branch to
assume policymaking authority vested by the Constitution in the Legislative Branch"); see
also Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-87 (2001) ("Like substantive federal law
itself, private rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by Congress.").
138. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
139. For further discussion of this point, see infra Part III.
140. See, e.g., Chicago City v. Robbins, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 418, 419 (1862) ("[Wlhere
private rights are to be determined by the application of common law rules alone, this
Court, although entertaining for State tribunals the highest respect, does not feel bound
by their decisions."); Lane v. Vick, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 464, 476 (1845) ("[T]he mere
construction of a will by a state court does not . .. constitute a rule of decision for the
courts of the United States.").
141. I emphasize here the word "our." For reasons discussed below, judges and
lawyers in the pre-Erie era would not have viewed the application of "federal general law,"
such as the law merchant or the law of nations, as the "displacement" of state law. See infra
Part III. Professor Green, writing within the modern understanding, objects to the
"displacement" rationale on quite different grounds. He states that no state law
"displacement" has occurred because state courts need not follow the federal rule of
decision in the future. Green, supra note 11, at 667 n.33. But otherwise applicable state
law was displaced in the very case before the Court, and in any future case in which the
litigants had access to the federal court. Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 19.
142. Our current conceptions have ancient roots, however. See The Federalist No. 80
(Alexander Hamilton), supra note 1, at 441-42 (emphasizing limited nature of judicial
power); The Federalist No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 1, at 453 (same); see also
Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 817-18 (1824) (noting "the legislative,
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more expansive reach, Swift was understood to rest upon the erroneous
belief that judicial power to displace state law was coextensive with the
unexercised power of Congress to do SO. 143 Separation of powers thus
provides a federalism safeguard. Clark agrees. On Clark's view, however,
the objection to Swift can be stated more simply: The only federal "Laws"
capable of displacing otherwise governing state law are those enacted
pursuant to Article I, Section 7.144
C. The Problem of Federal Common Law As ConstitutionalInterpretation
Of far greater moment, however, are the implications of Clark's thesis for constitutional preemption of state law-in such areas as interstate
disputes and admiralty-as well as ordinary statutory preemption. In
both areas, we are accustomed to seeing judge-made federal common law
45
follow a judicial determination that state law has been displaced.1 No
Supremacy Clause concern would thus exist for Clark, of course, because
no otherwise applicable state law has been displaced. But any resulting
judge-made federal law would nonetheless be a "Law" without having
passed through the Article I, Section 7 barriers. What gives the Court,
rather than Congress acting under Article I, Section 7, the authority to
fashion the regulating rule? 146 The identical question, of course, arises
even in cases of conflict between federal and state statutes. In Boyle v.
United Technologies Corp., for example, after concluding that state law was
preempted, Justice Scalia went on to fashion a federal rule, choosing in
executive, and judicial powers . . . are potentially co-extensive" and "the judicial
department may receive from the Legislature the power of construing every ... law").
143. Henry P. Monaghan, Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System,
87 Harv. L. Rev. 889, 892 (1974) (book review) (arguing it should be made clear "to
students at the outset that Erie is, fundamentally, a limitation on the federal court's power
to displace state law absent some relevant constitutional or statutory mandate which
neither the general language of [A]rticle III nor the jurisdictional statute provides"); see
also Paul J. Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on Eie-The Thread, 87 Harv. L. Rev.
1682, 1683-86 (1974) ("That Congress may have constitutional power to make federal law
displacing state substantive policy does not imply an equal range of power for federal
judges.").
144. Bradford R. Clark, Erie's Constitutional Source, 95 Cal. L. Rev. 1289, 1302-11
(2007) [hereinafter Clark, Constitutional Source].
145. See, e.g., Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988) (engaging in
federal common lawmaking following determination of "significant conflict" between state
law and federal policy).
146. As Professor Hill, relying on general separation of powers principles, wrote half a
century ago:
[E]ven if a particular area is one in which the federal government has power to
make independent law, it does not follow that a federal court has power to do so,
for the power of the federal courts does not correspond in all respects with the
power of the federal government as a whole.
Alfred Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw. U. L. Rev. 427, 441 (1958).
This point was recognized a very long time ago in United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11
U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) (noting existence of implied powers in national government
does not mean that they inhere in courts).
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the manner of a common lawjudge an alternative over the rule proposed
by the government.' 4 7 What, under Clark's view, was the source of the
Court's authority to do more than simply announce that the particular
state rule had been displaced?
Clark clearly struggles with this type of question. He asserts, for example, that Boyle is a case of constitutional interpretation-of state law
interference with the constitutional prerogatives of the national government, even though no member of the Court treated it as such.' 4 8 His
struggles become even more apparent in his most recent work, "The
Federal Common Law of Nations."1 4 9 Clark and his coauthor, Professor
Anthony Bellia, posit a middle ground between those who view customary
international law as directly applicable federal common law, and those
who insist that it has no applicability unless adopted by an organ of federal or state government.15 0 The authors view the Court's early law of
nations decisions in separation of power terms: ready-made, off-the-rack
background rules used to reinforce the supremacy of the political
branches in the conduct of our foreign policy. 15'
Consistent with
Supremacy Clause textualism, however, the authors deny that early references to the law of nations as part of "the law of the land" were meant to
include that law as part of "the supreme law of the land under the
Supremacy Clause."*5 2 What is of interest about this comprehensive article is that it reads like the work of an author looking over his shoulder.
How does the federal common law of nations bind the states, since it is
not enacted pursuant to Article I, Section 7? Bellia and Clark frequently
emphasize that the early case law seldom faced the issue of preemption of

147. 487 U.S. at 512-13.
148. Clark explains: "Restricting federal immunity to contractors who satisfy the
various requirements of the defense does not constitute improper judicial lawmaking.
Rather, these requirements appear necessary to implement an essential feature of the
constitutional scheme-namely, the division of authority between the federal government
and the states over military procurement matters." Clark, Federal Common Law, supra
note 128, at 1368-75.
149. Bellia & Clark, supra note 11.
150. Id. at 90-93.
151. Id. at 74-75.
152. Id. at 10-11. Rather, they assert, these references merely acknowledge that in
England the common law incorporated the law of nations. After the Constitution was
ratified, judges initially gave little thought to whether the United States as a whole had
adopted the common law or, by extension, the law of nations. Following the Sedition Act
controversy and the Supreme Court's rejection of federal common law crimes in 1812, the
Marshall Court began to recast the application of sovereignty-respecting rules derived from
the law of nations as a consequence of the domestic separation of powers. Id. at 54-55,
63-74. The authors argue that Sabbatino essentially adopts this rationale by holding that, in
the absence of contrary instructions from the political branches, federal and state courts
alike must apply the act of state doctrine-a sovereignty-respecting rule-and not an
alleged rule of international law prohibiting uncompensated takings-a sovereigntylimiting rule. Id. at 84-90.
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state law. 15 3 In the end, however, the authors acknowledge that their separation of powers-based international law would preempt state law. 154
Why? Because the source of preemption is derived from Articles I and II,
not from any independent judicial authority to fashion federal common
law.' 55
What does all this tell us? Clark, if I understand him correctly, believes that all federal common law, as we understand the term, is illegitimate.1 5 6 For him, when federal judges fashion common law, they are,
despite the titles of Clark's various articles,' 5 7 engaged in some form of
constitutionalinterpretationbased upon freestanding conceptions of federalism or separation of powers. Clark writes, for example:
As I have argued elsewhere, many of the "federal common law"
rules that fall within these enclaves do not actually constitute
"federal judge-made law" because they consist of background
principles derived from the law of nations that are necessary to
implement basic aspects of the constitutional scheme. Examples of such rules include the act of state doctrine, diplomatic
immunity, rules upholding the constitutional equality of the
states, certain admiralty rules, and rules recognizing federal immunity from state interference.15 8
153. Id. at 55-56 (noting that "[iln the nation's first decades" federal courts did not
treat the law merchant or the law maritime "as either state law or preemptive federal law;
they simply applied the law without attributing it to any particular sovereign"); id. at 75
("None of these [early cases involving the law of nations] expressly involved preemption of
state law; in each, the federal court exercised exclusive jurisdiction, and state law did not
purport to provide a conflicting rule of decision.").
154. Id. at 75 ("The Constitution preempts conflicting state law, and presumably
would have governed as the rule of decision had these cases originally been brought in
state court or had they involved conflicting state law."); id. at 93 ("[S]ome aspects of the
law of nations .. . have functioned as preemptive federal law because of the Constitution's
allocation of foreign relations powers in Articles I and II.").
155. Bellia and Clark argue:
[T]he Court's application of these rules does not rest on an interpretation of any
lawmaking powers it purportedly enjoys under Article III, but on its
interpretation of Congress's and the President's exclusive powers under Articles I
and II. . .. [I] t follows that states must adhere to these rules not because they are
supreme in and of themselves, but because [such adherence] uphold[s] the
Constitution's assignment of foreign affairs powers to the federal political
branches and its corresponding denial of such powers to the states.
Id. at 76.
156. Clark acknowledges that courts could fashion federal common law pursuant to a
delegation, but argues that claims of congressional delegation must be scrutinized
carefully. Clark, Constitutional Source, supra note 144, at 1309 n.141.
157. See, e.g., Bellia & Clark, supra note 11; Clark, Federal Common Law, supra note
128.
158. Clark, Role of Structure, supra note 12, at 711 (citations omitted). This Article
does not explore here the argument that rules derived from the law of nations are properly
understood as the "background principles" for constitutional interpretation. For me, what
is important is the fact that the fundamental process is one of constitutional interpretation.
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These are apparently all "constitutionally derived rules of decision."' 5 9 In that vein, Clark also explains the federal common law governing interstate disputes as constitutional interpretation, as a structural
inference from the constitutionally rooted principle that new states are
admitted on an "equal footing" with the original states. 6 0
I am aware of no situation in which Clark posits valid federal common law as we have traditionally understood the term. He treats even
statutory preemption cases as exercises in constitutional interpretation, as
in Boyle. This is why, incidentally, Clark seeks to preclude any federal
judge-made maritime law; unlike prize litigation, maritime law cannot
easily be seen as implementing separation of powers or national federalism interests.' 6
Quite plainly, Clark radically shifts settled understanding by
recharacterizing federal common law as, at bottom, simple constitutional
interpretation. And what is the nature of this constitutional interpretation? As of yet, Clark avoids any claim that Congress could not displace
such judicially fashioned rules.16 2 If Congress can do so, however, how is
159. Bellia & Clark, supra note 11, at 9; see also supra note 128 and accompanying
text (discussing Clark's "reconceptualization" of federal common law).
160. Clark, Federal Common Law, supra note 128, at 1322-31. For Professor Clark,
the equal footing doctrine permitted the Court to draw upon extant law of nations
principles that implemented the corresponding principle of "perfect equality" of
sovereigns and offered a criterion for further reasoning in cases in which international law
principles supplied no answer. My own view is different:
Some tribunal must exist for settling interstate controversies; but it is a basic
presumption of the Constitution that the state courts may be too parochial to
administer fairly disputes in which important state interests are at issue. Nor does
it seem appropriate to restrict the choice of controlling substantive law to that of
one of the contending states. . . . Thus the authority to create federal common
law springs of necessity from the structure of the Constitution, from its basic
division of authority between the national government and the states.
Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional
Common Law, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 14 (1975) [hereinafter Monaghan, Constitutional
Common Law].
161. See, e.g., Clark, Federal Common Law, supra note 128, at 1341-60 (describing
evolution of admiralty jurisdiction and federal common law); Clark, Procedural
Safeguards, supra note 54, at 1689-90 ("Although the Court has long applied general
maritime law ('the law merchant') in admiralty cases, it did not regard such law either as
giving rise to federal question jurisdiction . . . or as binding in state court under the
Supremacy Clause for most of our constitutional history."). The Supreme Court, however,
has no doubt of its extensive power to fashion federal common law in this area, and has
noted that most such law is judge-made. See, e.g., Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale
Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 259 (1979) ("Admiralty law is judge-made law to a great
extent."); see also Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2619 (2008) ("Exxon
raises an issue of first impression about punitive damages in maritime law, which falls
within a federal court's jurisdiction to decide in the manner of a common law court,
subject to the authority of Congress to legislate otherwise if it disagrees with the judicial
result."). The Court proceeded to act with the same freedom as a common law court in
fashioning the appropriate measure of punitive damages.
162. See, e.g., Clark, Federal Common Law, supra note 128, at 1271-75. Congress
has, of course, frequently done so, and its actions have been sustained. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C.
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that result to be reconciled with Marbury v. Madison?16 3 If Congress can
indeed revise the judge-made rule, Clark's analysis, grounded as it is in
federalism and separation of powers, sounds very much (dare I say it) like
my old constitutional common law. 16 4
D. Additional Problemsfor Supremacy Clause Textualists
1. The Treaty Clause. - The Treaty Clause also presents particular
difficulties for Supremacy Clause textualists. Rejecting the English practice, Article VI declares treaties to be part of the "supreme Law of the
Land" without any further need for an implementing Act of Congress. 6 5
Early on, however, the Court recognized that some treaties are not immediately enforceable as domestic law (i.e., are non-self-executing 66 ), a
conclusion that continues to trouble numerous commentators.16 7 Rather
adroitly, Professor Carlos Manuel Vdzquez would have it that no literal
violation of the Supremacy Clause occurs under such circumstances because treaties are laws "addressed to" Congress.1 68 Discussing an aspect
of the common practice of Senate RUDs (reservations, understandings,
and declarations), however, Professor Vdzquez can find no such verbal
refuge and apparently simply bows to that now entrenched practice. Recognizing that a non-self-executing declaration might be thought to be a
nullity because (a) it is not part of the treaty and (b) it was not enacted in
accordance with Article I, Section 7, Professor Vdzquez argues that such
declarations should nonetheless be viewed as having legally effective do§ 2370(e) (2006) (limiting use of act of state doctrine, which was sustained in Banco
Nacional v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967)); see also Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304,
319-20 (1981) (sustaining 33 U.S.C. § 1311, which displaced prior judge-made rule
governing interstate water pollution).
163. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
164. See Monaghan, Constitutional Common Law, supra note 160. One difference is
that Clark likely would not, as I attempted to, extend constitutional common law reasoning
into the area of civil liberties.
165. Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and
the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 599, 616-22 (2008).
166. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) (Marshall, C.J.) (defining
when treaty must be executed by Congress). Professor Vizquez observes that the
conception of non-self-execution has been loosely applied to also include such matters as
no private right of action and the lack of judicially manageable standards. As a distinct
doctrine, however, non-self-execution is a determination by political actors as to the
treaty's status under domestic law. See Vdzquez, supra note 165, at 629-32 (discussing four
categories of non-self-execution).
167. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 Am. J. Int'l L. 760, 782-83
(1988) (arguing only narrow set of treaties should be considered non-self-executing); see
also VAzquez, supra note 165, at 684 (describing formalist argument regarding
enforceability of non-self-executing treaties).
168. Vdzquez, supra note 165, at 606-07. The Framers, of course, understood that
the Constitution was addressed to Congress. But Professor V;Azquez cites no support for an
understanding of treaties as "Laws" addressed to Congress. Cf. Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at
314 (describing congressional treaty obligations as contractual in nature).
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mestic law consequences1 69 He recognizes, however, that his analysis
"may not persuade an uncompromising formalist" (i.e., a Supremacy
Clause textualist).1 70 For me, the explanation is different: Treaties simply have not been accorded the status, in practice, that the text of the
7
Supremacy Clause apparently mandates.' '
2. The Take Care Clause. - And then there is the matter of the Take
Care Clause. 172 Does the President's responsibility to "take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed" include treaties?17 3 While acknowledging
that "the question is not free from doubt,"' 7 4 Professor Edward Swaine
presents a formidable case for their inclusion, including citation of
Supreme Court decisions that so assume.1 75 Hamilton went even further:
He believed that the Take Care Clause extends to "the laws of Nations as
well as the Municipal law, which recognizes and adopts those laws."1 76
169. Vdzquez, supra note 165, at 672-75.
170. Id. at 684. Even those writers most strongly committed to self-execution seem
consigned to asserting that there is a "strong presumption" of self-execution. Ernest A.
Young, Treaties as "Part of Our Law," 88 Tex. L. Rev. 91, 94 & n.22 (2009) [hereinafter
Young, Treaties] (collecting sources). "The problem is that Article Vi's categorical
language does not speak in terms of presumptions-even strong ones." Id. at 122.
Professor Young, no friend of the self-execution doctrine, would treat treaties as though
they were statutes for domestic law purposes.
171. VAzquez, supra note 165, at 681-85. Whether, particularly in light of modern
conditions, that is a good or bad development is a matter I need not consider here. See
Hathaway, Treaties End, supra note 78, at 1307-38 (arguing congressional-executive
agreements should wholly replace treaty process as mechanism for regulating foreign and
domestic consequences of our international engagements). In a recent essay written from
an avowedly nonoriginalist perspective hostile to self-executing treaties, Professor Bradley
denies that either the language or background history of the Supremacy Clause impels a
conclusion that treaties must be directly enforceable in courts. Curtis A. Bradley, Self
Execution and Treaty Duality, 2008 Sup. Ct. Rev. 131, 140-48. Bracketing for the purpose
of this Article his historical analysis, Bradley's textual claim seems to rest on his belief that
proponents of self-execution necessarily assert that judicial enforcement must occur
irrespective of independent doctrines that would limit judicial access, such as Article III,
standing, or implied rights of action. I am not one who holds such a position. Bradley also
ignores the fact that a treaty, even if not affirmatively enforceable, might constitute a
defense in an enforcement proceeding. Young, Treaties, supra note 170, at 109.
172. U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.
173. Edward T. Swaine, Taking Care of Treaties, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 331, 335 (2008)
(noting uncertainty surrounding scope of Take Care Clause). Professor Swaine notes that
some commentators have sought to locate presidential authority in the President's foreign
affairs powers. Id. at 332-33.
174. Id. at 343.
175. Id. at 342-53; see also Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States § 111 cmt. c (1987) ("That international law and agreements of the United
States are law of the United States means also that the President has the obligation and the
necessary authority to take care that they be faithfully executed."). Professor Swaine
argues that the President can enforce some non-self-executing treaties. See Swaine, supra
note 173, at 353-59. This is a position now apparently foreclosed by Medellin v. Texas, 128
S. Ct. 1346, 1357 (2008) (holding non-self-executing treaties require implementing
statutes).
176. Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus Number 1 (June 29, 1793), reprinted in The
Pacificus-Helvidius Debates of 1793-1794, at 14 (Morton J. Frisch ed., 2007).
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3. The Supremacy Clause Itself - And finally, of course, there is the
embarrassment of the text of the Supremacy Clause itself. The Clause
mentions the word "Laws" twice. The second part of the Supremacy
Clause (the "notwithstanding clause") reads: "[A]nd the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitutionor Laws of any
state to the Contrary notwithstanding."1 77 If "Laws" means only statutes,
does federal statutory law of any kind preempt state common law? Peter
Strauss observes that "[a]s a matter of text-reading, it is hard to give differing meanings to the same word, endowed with the same number and
the same capitalization in the same sentence of a single paragraph."1 7 8
Professor Clark, of course, acknowledges preemption. 7 9 In a terse response, he reminds us that the common law was understood in 1789 as a
distinct body of law, that it became effective only through reception statutes, 8 0 and that thus state common law is "Law" for purposes of the
Supremacy Clause. 8 1 That response, however, simply will not work. I
am aware of no context in which anyone understood, in 1789 or thereafter, that common law was, in fact, a form of statutory law. Swift v. Tyson
surely did not, holding that the word "laws" in the Rules of Decision Act
meant primarily statutes, but that it could include some common law rules
of decision. 18 2 Moreover, had the Court understood that state common
177. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
178. Strauss, Perils of Theory, supra note 54, at 1568-69 (citation omitted). To push
the matter further, one might ask whether any federal enactment, save a constitutional
amendment, could preempt state equity doctrines. Recall that Article III extends the
constitutional reach of federal courts "to all Cases, in Law and Equity." U.S. Const. art. III,

§ 2.
179. Clark, Procedural Safeguards, supra note 54, at 1685. The Supreme Court, of
course, has no doubt that federal statutes can preempt state common law. That was, for
example, the shared premise of every justice in Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1194-95
(2009), and the decisions they discuss.
180. Clark, Procedural Safeguards, supra note 54, at 1685. Of the original thirteen
states, this was not true of Connecticut, as Clark recognizes. Id. at 1685 n.25. Moreover,
the common law was administered by courts well prior to the extreme of reception statutes.
See Mary K. Bonsteel Tachau, Federal Courts in the Early Republic: Kentucky 1789-1816,
at 78 (1978). There is a rich literature on reception statutes, which absorbed both the
common law and English statutes. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 132-37
(1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing John Marshall source on reception of statutes and
common law). See generally Ford W. Hall, The Common Law: An Account of Its
Reception in the United States, 4 Vand. L. Rev. 791 (1951) (describing history and types of
reception statutes). Hall points out that colonial charters often separately referred to
"laws" and "statutes," and where they referred to "laws" alone, it was understood to include
the common law. Id. at 792. The antipathy of the common law lawyers to statutory law was
an important feature of nineteenth century American law. See Noga Morag-Levine,
Common Law, Civil Law, and the Administrative State: From Coke to Lochner, 24 Const.
Comment. 601, 606-07 (2007) (discussing nineteenth century glorification of common law
against rigidity of civil law).
181. Clark, Procedural Safeguards, supra note 54, at 1685.
182. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18-19 (1842). The Court also recognized that "laws"
included some common law decisions. Id. Sometimes, of course, the process of statutory
interpretation takes the shape of common law reasoning, however. See Henry Paul
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law was a form of statutory law, the state common "law" rule would have
been binding.' 8 3 And long before Swft, the distinguished commentator
St. George Tucker understood that the common law was a law quite distinct from acts of the legislature. 18 4
III. "LAws" AND THE LOST WORLD OF THE FOUNDERS

Some of the objections just described implicitly assume that the word
"Law[s]" has an invariant meaning throughout its appearance in the
Constitution. This is not, however, the case. As Professor Swaine observes, "[m]ost of the Constitution's references to 'the law,' 'law,' or
'Laws' relate to congressional statutes. But occasionally, even within Article I, 'law' encompasses federal or state law, state law only, the law of
nations, or an ambiguous class."' 8 5 Supremacy Clause textualists, however, need be concerned only with the meaning of "Laws" as it appears in
the Supremacy Clause.
The question remains: Shall we conclude that the original understanding was that "Laws" in the Supremacy Clause meant only Acts of
Congress? Reflection convinces me that the answer is yes; but it is for
reasons quite different from Clark's political and structural account. History also demonstrates, I believe, that our conception of federal common
law-judge-made law that would bind both federal and state courts-was
simply not a part of the Founders' intellectual landscape.
Monaghan, Supreme Court Review of State-Court Determinations of State Law in
Constitutional Cases, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1919, 1983-84 & n.317 (2003) [hereinafter
Monaghan, Supreme Court Review].
183. A decade before Swift, the Court recognized that it must follow the state court's
interpretation of a state statute. See Green v. Neal's Lessee, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 291, 297
(1832) ("In construing local statutes respecting real property, the courts of the union are
governed by the decisions of the state tribunals.").
184. See St. George Tucker, Of the Unwritten, or Common Law of England; and Its
Introduction into, and Authority Within the United American States, in View of the
Constitution of the United States with Selected Writings 313, 313-70 (Liberty Fund 1999)
(1803) (rejecting argument that adoption of Constitution also entailed adoption of
general common law of United States to be administered by new federal courts).
185. Swaine, supra note 173, at 342-43 (citations omitted). Professor Swaine
continues:
Sometimes the text is more precise. For example, care is taken elsewhere in
Article II to specify when the "law" concerned is one enacted by Congress. Article
III and the Supremacy Clause also distinguish between "the laws of the United
States" and "Treaties." If those provisions had referred only to "the laws of the
United States," would treaties have been excluded? More to the point, does the
fact that the Take Care Clause refers only to "the Laws" mean that treaties are
outside its ambit?
Id. at 343 (citations omitted). The point is that the same word in the Constitution can
carry different meanings, especially so for different persons. Madison understood that
clearly: "[N]o language," he said, "is so copious as to supply words and phrases for every
complex idea, or so correct as not to include many, equivocally denoting different ideas."
The Federalist No. 37 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 198.
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A. "Laws" and the Supremacy Clause
Understanding the nature of "Laws" as used in the Supremacy
Clause requires examination of the debates surrounding the meaning of
Article III, which permitted jurisdiction in the new federal courts in "all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority." 18 6 Throughout the first two decades of our national existence, intense debate occurred over the relationship between the new
national courts and an "American" common law. Did the adoption of the
Constitution somehow authorize those courts to administer such a common law just as each state administered its own version?18 7 Fears were
expressed, applicable in both the criminal and civil context, that pursuant to this provision (a) the federal courts would administer a substantive
common law as part of the "Constitution or Laws of the United States,"
and that (b) the Constitution itself conferred jurisdiction on the federal
courts to do so. 188 Some argued (or feared) that if the Constitution itself
somehow made the common law applicable in federal court, then even
Congress could not alter it.189 Others believed that the common law was
part of the "Constitution or Laws" mentioned in Article 111.190
Subject matter jurisdiction presented another set of difficulties.
While, as I discussed, some believed that the Constitution itself authorized federal courts to administer the new American common law, others
believed that implementing statutory authority was necessary.19 1 In a well
186. U.S. Const. art III, § 2.
187. The claim was that proponents of a federal court-administered common law
intended that the entire British system be taken over to America. Opponents of a federally
administered "American" common law, however, often exaggerated the claims of
proponents. See Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part Two, 133 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1231, 1254 (1985) [hereinafter Jay, Origins, Part II] ("Republicans of the Hudson era
rallied against a proposition that no serious rival was advancing. It would have been
untenable to maintain that the body of British common law had been adopted by the
Constitution, or that the federal judiciary possessed a jurisdiction equivalent to the ...
courts in England."). "'[L]aws' would have been taken to include rules emanating from
judicial decisions" but "article III could not have been meant to accomplish a general
reception of British common law." Id. at 1255.
188. For a detailed study of this history, see Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common
Law: Part One, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1003 (1985) [hereinafter Jay, Origins, Part I]; Jay,
Origins, Part II, supra note 187. Jay notes that in opposing ratification, Antifederalists
lamented the lack of due process rights secured by the common law, but by the end of the
1790s they vigorously objected to an "American" common law. Id. at 1258.
189. James Madison, Virginia Resolutions of 1798, reprinted in 4 Elliot's Debates in
the State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 528, 565 (Jonathan
Elliot ed., 2d ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1866) [hereinafter Madison's
Report]; Jay, Origins, Part I, supra note 188, at 1081; see also id. at 1040-41 (noting
approaches to common law crimes espoused by Justices Jay, Wilson, and Iredell).
190. See Jay, Origins, Part I, supra note 188, at 1082 (noting comments by
Representative Otis in support of this concept).
191. With respect to common law offenses against the United States, Justice Story
concluded in United States v. Coolidge, 25 F. Cas. 619, 619-20 (Story, Circuit Justice,
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known letter to the prominent conservative constitutional theorist St.
George Tucker, future Chief Justice Marshall apparently acknowledged
that the common law itself was not a source of jurisdictional authority,
but he stated that if such jurisdictional authority had been statutorily conferred, "I do not understand you as questioning the propriety of thus
applying the common law, not of England, but of our own country."192
A staggering variety of writing on these topics emerged. The arguments opposing a federal common law (i.e., a federal general law, not,
however, federal common law as we understand the term) were varied.
Conspiracy theories abounded, especially among Republicans, by whom
"unelected, unaccountable and yet thoroughly partisan [federal judges],
were seen as using common-law jurisdiction to transfer the political authority of the states to Federalist conspirators."s9 3 Particularly with respect to common law offenses against the United States, this fear was, in
fact, no chimera. For example, during the 1790s every single justice, exceptJustice Chase, apparently believed in the existence of a body of common law crimes against the United States that could be prosecuted in the
federal courts. 194
C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 14,857), that Section 11 of theJudiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat 78, 79,
conferred the requisite statutory jurisdiction. See also Jay, Origins, Part I, supra note 188,
at 1019 n.59 (collecting additional sources). United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S.
(7 Cranch) 32 (1812), denying the existence of a federal common law of crimes against the
United States, however, is inconsistent with Justice Story's view.
192. Letter from John Marshall to St. George Tucker (Nov. 27, 1800), reprinted in
Jay, Origins, Part II, supra note 187, at 1326-27; see also, e.g., Peter S. Du Ponceau, A
Dissertation on the Nature and Extent of theJurisdiction of the Courts of the United States
99 (Philadelphia, Abraham Small 1824) ("It appears to me also that by the words 'the laws
of the United States,' the framers of the Constitution only meant the statutes which should
be enacted by the national Legislature."). But Du Ponceau goes on to write that:
[o]n the whole, therefore, I think I may venture to assert that when the federal
Courts are sitting in or for the States, they can, it is true, derive no jurisdiction
from the common law, because the people of the United States, in framing their
Constitution, have thought proper to restrict them within certain limits; but that
whenever by the Constitution or the laws made in pursuance of it, jurisdiction is
given to them either over the person or subject matter, they are bound to take the
common law as their rule of decision whenever other laws, national or local, are
not applicable.
Id. at 101.
193. Jay, Origins, Part I, supra note 188, at 1111; see also id. at 1037 ("Republicans
related almost every issue regarding the federal courts to some overall conspiracy.").
194. Id. at 1016-17, 1067-78; see also 1 Julius Goebel, Jr., History of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801, at 623-24 (1971)
[hereinafter Goebel, Antecedents and Beginnings] (describing position ofJustice Jay that
"the law of nations was a part of the law of the United States and that prosecutions for
violations were maintainable whether or not Congress had exercised its powers to provide
for their punishment"); Kathryn Preyer, Jurisdiction to Punish: Federal Authority,
Federalism, and the Common Law of Crimes in the Early Republic, 4 L. & Hist. Rev. 223,
226-30 (1986) (noting division of judicial opinion but also noting infrequency of
nonstatutory criminal prosecutions).
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While the specific danger of a federal common law of crimes against
the United States receded with the decision in United States v. Hudson &
Goodwin, denying such authority,1 9 5 the vigorous debate it generated over
the relationship of the common law and the new national government is
illuminating.1 9 6 This debate, to be sure, was colored by underlying divisions about the nature of the new government established by the
Constitution. Debates over the common law "were but the surface manifestations of essential tensions in a society that was defining itself in the
midst of what was literally a revolutionary era."1 9 7 Reflecting the Federalist view, Professor William Crosskey long ago claimed that "the Laws of
the United States" was meant to encompass the body of common law inherited from the English tradition.1 9 8 In a subsequent and exhaustive
study, ProfessorJay concluded that a "survey ofjurisdictional theory from
the Hudson period" shows a general awareness that "federal courts had
what we would term significant common-law powers."199 After reviewing
the scholarship on federal common law, a student Note argued further
that "ample evidence" existed to support an understanding that "laws" in
Article III included decisional law:
In the latter part of the eighteenth century, "everyone understood decisional principles to be 'laws,"' and early congressional
legislation reflected this understanding. In section 25 of the
195. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 34. Notably, the Court did not cite the
Supremacy Clause. See also United States v. Coolidge, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415, 416 (1816)
(noting Attorney General's decision not to argue case in light of Hudson & Goodwin and
declining to revisit issue); Jay, Origins, Part I, supra note 188, at 1012-19 (discussing
decision in Hudson & Goodwin); Jay, Origins, Part II, supra note 187, at 1241 (placing
decision in context of "partisan struggles of the 1790's"). ProfessorJay also maintains that
"Hudson was decided in a peculiar setting of partisan disturbance, and grew out of a fear
that . .. there was a scheme afoot to install a consolidated national government through
incorporation of the British common law." Id. at 1323.
196. Professor Goebel, however, disparages the debates as producing a less than
"searching inquiry on a professional level into what was the constitutional variant for
judicial dependence upon the common law." 1 Goebel, Antecedents and Beginnings,
supra note 194, at 654. I believe that this criticism is largely unfounded.
197. Jay, Origins, Part II, supra note 187, at 1236.
198. See William Winslow Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of the
United States 621-25 (1953) ("Americans generally regarded the Common Law, including
its British statutory amendments, as the general basic customary law of all the American
colonies."). Professor Eskridge's study of the judicial role at the time of ratification also
supports a broad view of the judicial power. He concludes that "judges interpreting
statutes" were thought to be both "agents carrying out directives laid down by the
legislature and partners in the enterprise of law elaboration, for they (like the legislature)
are ultimately agents of 'We the People.'" William N. Eskridge,Jr., All About Words: Early
Understandings of the "Judicial Power" in Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101
Colum. L. Rev. 990, 992 (2001).
199. Jay, Origins, Part II, supra note 187, at 1323; see also Gary D. Rowe, Note, The
Sound of Silence: United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, the Jeffersonian Ascendancy, and the
Abolition of Federal Common Law Crimes, 101 Yale L.J. 919, 935 (1992) (arguing Hudson
& Goodwin represented change in practice influenced greatly by Jeffersonians' political
triumph in 1800 and their opposition to Alien and Sedition laws).
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Judiciary Act of 1789 reference is made in the first clause to
"statutes" of the United States, in the second to "a Statute of any
State" and to "laws" of the United States, and in the third to
"statutes" of the United States. If the framers of section 25 had
considered "laws" and "statutes" to be synonymous, they would
surely have used either the term "laws" or "statutes" consistently
throughout the section. And in section 34 of the same act, the
phrase "laws of the several states" was apparently intended to
comprehend both statutes and common law. Additional support for an interpretation of "laws" as including federal common law is found in the history of the drafting of Article III.
The "arising under" clause originally read, "arising under laws
passed by the legislature of the United States," but the phrase
"passed by the legislature" was omitted when Article III was
adopted. 20 0
But other writers opposed the view that "laws" encompassed common law as well as statutes, at least in the newly established federal
courts.2 0 Many of the historical arguments offered in support of this
view echo Professor Ramsey's earlier remarks: 2 02 They focus on the extensive debates at the time of the Founding regarding the extent of congressionalpower. The Founders could not have conceived of an ability of
the federal judiciary to impose a common law; otherwise, why would the
debates surrounding ratification have focused almost exclusively on the
potential for congressional overreaching, without mentioning the even
more expansive law-declaring authority of the judiciary? 203 Still others
pointed out that if the federal courts could administer an American common law, their power to regulate private activity would exceed the powers
conferred on Congress by Article I, Section 8.204
200. Note, Federal Common Law and Article III: A Jurisdictional Approach to Eie,
74 Yale L.J. 325, 331-32 (1964) [hereinafter Note, Federal Common Law] (citations
omitted); see also Jay, Origins, Part II, supra note 187, at 1255 ("[T]o an eighteenthcentury lawyer (which is what a majority of the Framers were) 'laws' would have been taken
to include rules emanating from decisions . . . .").

But see Henry M. Hart & Herbert

Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 19 (1953) (arguing change in
Article III from "laws passed by the legislature of the United States" to "laws of the United
States" was only change in wording).
201. Tucker, supra note 184, at 360-64 (opposing existence of general common law
authority in federal courts).
202. See supra notes 24-43 and accompanying text.
203. See Note, Federal Common Law, supra note 200, at 334 (noting Randolph, "an
active participant in the drafting of Article III," was "not aware . . . [it] would give federal
courts jurisdiction over all general common law cases"). Moreover, the argument that
"laws" includes the English common law seems to assume that the English common law was
observed uniformly throughout the colonies and thus could easily be incorporated as one
body of national common law. In fact, each of the thirteen colonies had developed its own
variation on the English common law prior to ratification. See infra note 213 and
accompanying text (notingJustice Chase's classic exposition of variations in state common
law).
204. Madison's Report, supra note 189, at 566; Jay, Origins, Part I, supra note 188, at
1080-81. Other writers, however, stated that recognition of the common law also
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The most penetrating criticism was by St. George Tucker. In an extended essay, 205 Tucker analyzed the relationship between the common
law and the new national government. After examining the status of the
common law within the colonies and the several states, 2 06 he addressed
the national government. He asked: "How far that portion of the common law and statutes of England, which has been retained by the several
states, respectively, has been engrafted upon, or made a part of the
constitution of the United States[?]" 20 7
Tucker turned first to the constitutionally enumerated powers of
Congress and concluded that none warranted wholesale adoption of a
national common law for the United States. 208 That conclusion was even
209
Then
clearer with respect to the grants of power to the executive.
He
111.210
in
Article
grants
Tucker addressed the specific jurisdictional
apply
would
courts
federal
acknowledged that, in appropriate cases, the
the common law, just as they would apply French or Belgian law based
upon ordinary principles of conflict of laws. 211 But he found no general
grant of common law jurisdiction in the Constitution, and he denied that
the Constitution contained such a grant by implication. More specifically, he argued that any such contention, if accepted, would obliterate
the conception of the national government as being one of limited powers. He wrote:
If it were admitted, that the federal government, by implication,
possesses general jurisdiction over all cases at common law; this
construction could not be carried into practice, without annihilating the states, and repealing, and annulling, their several constitutions, bills of rights, and legislative codes: as a few instances
will demonstrate. 2 12
increased national legislative power, on the premise that legislative power was at least
coextensive with judicial power. See Jay, Origins, Part II, supra note 187, at 1241-42
(noting "[a]n accepted axiom" of era "was that judicial power had to be 'co-extensive' with
legislative authority"); Tucker, supra note 184, at 315 ("For, if it be true that the common
law of England, has been adopted by the United States . . . the jurisdiction of the federal
courts must be co-extensive with it; ... so also, must be the jurisdiction, and authority of the
other branches of the federal government; . . .").

205. Tucker, supra note 184, at 313-70. The essay was entitled "Of the Unwritten, or
Common Law of England; And Its Introduction into, and Authority Within the United
American States." Id.
206. Id. at 316-19.
207. Id. at 345.
208. Id. at 346-49.
209. Id. at 350.
210. Id. at 351-55.
211. Id. at 353, 361; see also supra note 187 (discussing debates over reception of
English common law).
212. Tucker, supra note 184, at 356; see also Lucas A. Powe, Jr., The Supreme Court
and the American Elite, 1789-2008, at 37-39 (2009) (noting observation of St. George
Tucker that "the common law had unlimited reach; [and] this meant that the powers of
the federal government, too, would be unlimited").
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There is an aspect of these intriguing debates that has special pertinence to our inquiry. Americans understood that the common law varied
from state to state,2 13 and Republicans in particular thought that there
was no room for a national common law, particularly as the instrumental
(rather than the declaratory) nature of the common law increasingly began to take hold in legal thinking. 2 14 Nonetheless, Swift v. Tyson's distinction between "general" and "local" law had been familiar for decades. 2 15
And those portions of the common law known as the law of nations and
the law merchant were perhaps universally held to be part of the "general
law." As Lord Mansfield, for example, said of the law merchant: "The
mercantile law . .. is the same all over the world." 2 16 As such, these bodies of law were conceived of as "declaratory" in nature, part of a universal
law, which in turn was rooted in the natural law. 21 7 But legal writers
would not have called that unwritten law "federal common law." 218 State
courts as well as federal courts were obliged to apply the general law.2 19
213. For a classic exposition, see the opinion of justice Chase in United States v.
Worrall, 28 F. Cas. 774, 779 (Chase, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Pa. 1798) (No. 16,766)
(stressing variations in common law of several states); see also Julius Goebel, Jr., Ex Parte
Clio, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 450, 464 (1954) (book review) [hereinafter Goebel, Ex Parte Clio]
(same).
214. Morton J. Horowitz, The Transformation of American Law 1780-1860, at 1-30
(1977). Professor Horowitz has been widely criticized on his dating as well as the speed of
the attitudinal shift he describes. See, e.g., Jay, Origins, Part II, supra note 187, at 1251
("[B]y removing his analysis almost totally from the political struggles of the period,
Horowitz fails to perceive the principal reasons for anxiety over judicial activity.").
215. See Tony Freyer, Harmony and Dissonance: The Swift and Erie Cases in
American Federalism 26-40 (1981) [hereinafter Freyer, Harmony and Dissonance] ("The
distinction between general and local law . .. was worked out gradually from the 1790s to
1842 in the federal courts."); see also William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and
Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 Harv. L.
Rev. 1513, 1514 (1984) (noting in context of Section 34 of Judiciary Act of 1789 "[t]here
was a 'local' state law, to which the section applied, and a 'general' law, to which it did
not"); Jay, Origins, Part II, supra note 187, at 1265 ("Long before Swift v. Tyson was
decided, federal courts recognized the division between general and local law . . . .").
216. Pelly v. Governor of the Royal Exch. Assurance, (1757) 97 Eng. Rep. 342, 342,
346 (KB.); see also Freyer, Harmony and Dissonance, supra note 215, at 34-35 (collecting
sources). For the purposes of this Article, I need not pursue here what it meant to say that
the law merchant or the law of nations was "part" of the common law. See Jay, Origins,
Part II, supra note 187, at 1279.
217. Goebel, Ex Parte Clio, supra note 213, at 456. Professor Goebel denies, however,
that Mansfield believed that the law merchant had natural law underpinnings. Id. at
456-57. Strangely, he ignores Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), in which Justice
Story's opinion quotes Lord Mansfield's invocation of Cicero's declamation on material
law in a case involving the law merchant. See infra note 228 and accompanying text.
Whether natural law did more than provide an "authority independent of human creation"
for the rights created in "British Constitutional and positive law" is a separate issue. See
John Reid, The Authority of Rights at the American Founding, in The Nature of Rights at
the American Founding and Beyond 67, 93 (Barry Alan Shain ed., 2007).
218. Jay, Origins, Part II, supra note 187, at 1266.
219. Id. Thus, federal/state differences on the content of the general law were not
viewed as infringements on state sovereignty. Id. at 1270.
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In the jurisprudential thinking of the decades following 1788, federal
"general" law would not have been conceived of as "displacing" state law,
but as simply attempting to achieve a more accurate and consistent version of the "true" general law. For that reason, in Swift, Justice Story
could speak of judicial decisions as only "evidence" of what the true law
was. 220
General law, which included the law of nations and the law
merchant, had important practical significance. As Professor Freyer
makes clear, the founding generation, whatever their other differences,
was united in a conviction that uniformity was desirable with respect to
commercial rules of decision, and that the federal courts were in a position to achieve that goal.22 1 What the Constitution and jurisdictional
grants did was to ensure that to the extent that this law had a trans-state
or a transnational dimension, parties could have access to the federal
courts. 22 2
But, as I said, that did not mean that the state law was thereby preempted by a federal common law, as we understand the term. Swit reflected the idea that state judges were free to take their own views as to
the general commercial law, a position endorsed by members of the
Court sensitive to any expansion of national power at the expense of the
states. Unsurprisingly, the Supreme Court consistently refused to review,
for want ofjurisdiction, state court decisions on the meaning of the "general" law. To the Swift generation and its predecessor, "[i]t seems apparent-Justice Brandeis and Erie to the contrary notwithstanding-that federal-state relations were implicit and probably only secondary factors in
the case." Rather, it was a commercial law case "grounded in the behavior of the mercantile world."22
It was not until the late 1880s that the Court began, particularly in
cases involving interstate disputes, to conclude that its decisions were
binding as federal common law; that is, binding in both the state and the
federal courts. 224 But in 1788, no such conception of federal common
law existed.
220. Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18.
221. Freyer, Harmony and Dissonance, supra note 215, at 18-26, 34-35.
222. Professor Jay notes:
A wealth of evidence is available to demonstrate an original understanding that
certain recognized bodies of law should be developed uniformly, and that
interference by the states would have negative ramifications at home and abroad.
But historically these areas were not "federalized" in the way implicated by the
current invocation of federal common law. Uniformity was instead to be achieved
by providing access to federal courts, sometimes exclusive of state courts.
Jay, Origins, Part II, supra note 187, at 1321.
223. Freyer, Harmony and Dissonance, supra note 215, at 41-42. Briefly revisiting
Swift, Professor Freyer emphasizes that the entire Court saw it simply as a case about
commercial law. Tony A. Freyer, Swift and Erie: The Trials of an Ephemeral Landmark
Case, 34J. Sup. Ct. Hist. 261, 261-68 (2009).
224. Prior to the 1880s, the Supreme Court viewed itself as unable, on direct review of
state court judgments, to fashion judge-made rules that were binding on the states. See
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This background drawn from Article III has important implications
for an understanding of the Supremacy Clause. It may be, as Professor
Jay writes, that it "is likely that we will never know with assurance what was
meant by the deliberate use of 'laws' in [A]rticle III."225 But for me, the
probabilities point strongly in one direction, at least as to the meaning of
"Laws" in the Supremacy Clause. Look again at the wording:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be
the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 2 26
Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 638 (1874) ("The claim of right here
set up is one to be determined by the general principles of equity jurisprudence, and is
unaffected by anything found in the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.
Whether decided well or otherwise by the State court, we have no authority to inquire.");
Delmas v. Ins. Co., 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 661, 666 (1871) ("When a decision on that point,
whether holding such contract valid or void, is made upon the general principles by which
courts determine whether a consideration is good or bad on principles of public policy,
the decision is one we are not authorized to review."); Freyer, Harmony and Dissonance,
supra note 215, at 39-40 (stating that in 1842, "no one imagined that federal judges
possessed authority over state courts");Jay, Origins, Part I, supra note 188, at 1010 ("There
was no coherent concept in the early nineteenth century of 'federal common law' as we
now make use of that expression."); cf. Monaghan, Supreme Court Review, supra note 182,
at 1947-55, 1968-71 (describing Supreme Court jurisdiction to review state court
determinations of state law). By the end of the nineteenth century, however, the Court
openly fashioned judge-made law that bound state courts, although the grounds for the
claimed authority were often varied and unclear. See S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205,
215 (1917) (holding maritime law is governed by rules of federal common law); Kansas v.
Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 95-98 (1906) (claiming authority to fashion federal common law
rule to resolve interstate water disputes even though Congress lacks such power); W. Union
Tel. Co. v. Call Publ'g Co., 181 U.S. 92, 102 (1901) ("[T]he principles of the common law
are operative upon all interstate commercial transactions except so far as they are modified
by Congressional enactment."); Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 478-79 (1888) (stating a
code of constitutional and statutory construction .. . gradually formed by the judgments
of [the] court . . . constitutes a common law resting on national authority"); Freyer,
Harmony and Dissonance, supra note 215, at 71-72 (describing 1893 decision as "turning
point" because dissenting Justice "explicitly stated that federal judges possessed the
authority to apply an independent judgment as to rules of decision" in some
circumstances); Robert von Moschzisker, The Common Law and Our Federal
Jurisprudence (Concluded.), 74 U. Pa. L. Rev. 367, 368-86 (1926) (collecting cases from
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to demonstrate that federal courts
recognized and applied body of federal common law).
225. Jay, Origins, Part II, supra note 187, at 1255; see also Hill, Constitutional
Preemption, supra note 133, at 1029 n.30 (collecting cases where "a particular legislative
scheme effects a federal occupation of a field, negating state competence, and devolving
upon the federal courts the duty of fashioning rules of decision"); von Moschzisker, supra
note 224, at 380 ("[W]hen there is no congressional statute prescribing the law to be
administered in matters over which the national legislature has exclusive control . . . [the
Court] applied such common-law principles as [it] . . . considered appropriate and

just . . . .").
226. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
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Focus should be trained on the word "made," not "Laws." The latter
term could and frequently did include common law. But in 1788, no one
would have used the word "made" in reference to the law of nations or
the law merchant. 22 7 These bodies of law were discovered, not enacted.
Indeed, as late as Swift v. Tyson, which involved an ordinary commercial
transaction, Justice Story cited as authority for a legal proposition the immense authority of Lord Mansfield, who, in turn, cited Cicero's famous
declamation on natural law.22 8 Referring to the "ordinary use of language," Justice Story wrote that "it will hardly be contended that the decisions of Courts constitute laws. They are, at most, only evidence of what
the laws are; and are not of themselves laws." 229 Indeed, most would not
have used the term "made" to describe even the local common law of the
states, which they believed to be largely rooted in custom and reason. 23 0
This was in accordance with the Blackstonian tradition. 23 1
B. The Road Not Taken
Professor Clark's conception of the state-protective focus of the
Constitutional Convention does not require him to read the Supremacy
Clause in the manner in which he ultimately chooses. There exists a road
not taken by Clark and other Supremacy Clause textualists. Professor
227. Jay, Origins, Part II, supra note 187, at 1275. "Moreover," Jay adds, "it would
have made no sense" for the Supremacy Clause to refer to the unwritten law. Id. General
common law was already binding in the states by the very nature of its transnational
character; local common law was entirely the affair of a particular jurisdiction. Michael
Conant emphasizes the "discovered" nature of those branches of the common law such as
the law merchant and the maritime law. Michael Conant, The Constitution and the
Economy 133-54 (1991) ("The law merchant had become part of the common-law system,
but it was an independent branch, as were equity and maritime law."). Clark himself
makes this point. See Clark, Procedural Safeguards, supra note 54, at 1686 ("At the time
the [Supremacy] Clause was written, lawyers understood the common law to be discovered
rather than made by judges." (footnote omitted)).
228. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 19 (1842) (citing Luke v. Lyde, (1759) 97 Eng.
Rep. 614, 617 (K.B.)). Swift in turn quotes Cicero's classic declamation on natural law:
"Non eit alia lex Romae, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia posthac, sed et apud omnes gentes, et
omni tempore, una eademque lex obtenebit." Id. See generally Jeremy Waldron, The
Supreme Court, 2004 Term-Comment: Foreign Law and the Modern lus Gentium, 119
Harv. L. Rev. 129 (2005) (arguing law of nations supports citing foreign law).
229. Swi 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18. This explains why the southern Justices, though
zealously on guard against the expansion of national power against the states, joined the
Swift opinion. See Freyer, Harmony and Dissonance, supra note 215, at 26 ("The
distinction between general and local law . . . provide[s] a more complete basis for
explaining the unanimity of the Court and the reasons whyJacksonian judges could readily
distinguish certain commercial issues from the sensitive question of federal jurisdiction
over the common law.").
230. This conception of the common law "found many adherents throughout the
1800's." Jay, Origins, Part II, supra note 187, at 1252.
231. For Blackstone, judges were "the living oracles," I William Blackstone,
Commentaries *69, of a legal order based on natural law and immemorial custom. Id. at
*64-*70.
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William Casto captures an important aspect of the intellectual climate as
it existed at the founding:
In the Founding Era, appointment to the Supreme Court was
not nearly as coveted as it is today. This comparative lack of
prestige was due in part to the fact that no one believed that the
justices of that court or any other court exercised legislative authority to make laws. Americans of the Founding Era were natural lawyers-not legal positivists. 232
It thus might have been possible for Clark to develop a theory that
Article I, Section 7 was designed to prevent political intrusions on the
states by the national government, but that the "found" law of nations,
the law merchant (as seen in Swift v. Tyson), and perhaps other aspects of
the common law would not have been understood to have had such a
character. While these bodies of law provided rules of decision for many
cases, the rules themselves were not "attached to any particular sovereign."2 3 I submit that this description far more accurately captures the
intellectual terrain circa 1789 than that presented to us by Supremacy
Clause textualists.
But this is a road not taken. Why not? Because the real underpinning of Clark's work is not the Supremacy Clause, but rather the three
lawmaking mechanisms he has specified. Would Clark or any other
Supremacy Clause textualist argue that "This Constitution" and the
"Laws ... made in Pursuance thereof" would not be the "supreme Law of
the Land" if no Supremacy Clause existed? 234 I greatly doubt it. To my
mind, the driving force of Clark's work is not the Supremacy Clause at all;
rather, he views that Clause as simply a textual embodiment of deeper
underlying conceptions of federalism and separation of powers. Thus, if
one of the three national mechanisms for the displacement of state law is
not implicated, the states are, as a substantive constitutional matter, free
to apply their own law. As Professor Young observes, it is Clark's conception of American separation of powers, not the law of nations, that does
all the real work. 235
232. William R. Casto, Legal Positivism and the Documentary History of the Supreme
Court, 11 Green Bag 2d 387, 391 (2008) (citing William R. Casto, The Erie Doctrine and
the Structure of Constitutional Revolutions, 62 Tul. L. Rev. 907 (1987) (analyzing Erie,
inter alia, in such terms)). Clark seemingly recognizes this point with respect to the
common law, which, in his opinion, "was never thought to be intrinsically state law." Clark,
Procedural Safeguards, supra note 54, at 1685. The "found" nature of the lex mercatoria
explains the unanimity in Swift, a Court comprised of a majority of southern Justices ever
alert to any expansion of federal power. Freyer, Harmony and Dissonance, supra note 215,
at 26.
233. Fletcher, supra note 215, at 1517. This, of course, helps explain why southern
Justices found no reason to object to decisions such as Swift. See supra note 229 and
accompanying text.
234. Following the English practice, treaties might have required implementing
legislation. See supra Part II.D.1.
235. Professor Young writes:
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C. A Lost World
The intellectual universe of the founding generation-a universe in
which much law was discovered, not made-is irretrievably lost. Nevertheless, as Professor Tushnet wrote many years ago:
When interpretivists presume that they can detach the meanings
that the framers gave to the words they used from the entire
complex of meanings that the framers gave to their political vocabulary as a whole and from the larger political, economic, and
intellectual world in which they lived, interpretivists slip into the
error of thinking that they can grasp historical parts without embracing the historical whole. 236
These remarks apply with full force to Supremacy Clause textualists.
At the time of the founding, judicial decisions were more than evidence
of a "deeper" or "truer" law; in an age in which statutes were few, decisional law was often "law" as that term was understood during the founding generation, and well before. But the conception of an unmoored
"general law" has all but disappeared from our thinking. For our purposes, two nineteenth century developments are particularly noteworthy
in bringing about that result. These developments are well known and
need be only briefly recounted here. The first I have already mentioned:
the increasing recognition during the nineteenth century that the law
pronounced by judges had an instrumental or "legislative" character to it,
that judicially declared law was often judicially "made" law.2 3 7
The second development was the rise of legal positivism. While the
founding generation could entertain a conception of a nation-state enforcing grounding rules of decision unattached to any sovereign, after
At the end of the day, it is far from clear what work the law of nations actually
does in Professors Bellia and Clark's conceptions of foreign relations law. They
appear to argue that federal courts must have some authority to apply the law of
nations with the force of federal law, without action by the political branches,
where such application is necessary to protect political branch prerogatives in
foreign affairs-and particularly with respect to matters of war and peace. In
such situations, however, it seems likely that federal courts would find power to
act with or without the law of nations, deriving that authority directly from the
constitutional separation of powers. Such instances are likely to be few and far
between, however. Congress has regulated the exercise of foreign affairs powers
largely by statute, and in the absence of such advance provision, the Supreme
Court has lately been unwilling to take unilateral action even in the face of
significant foreign policy consequences.
Ernest A. Young, Historical Practice and the Contemporary Debate over Customary
International Law, 109 Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 31, 39 (2009), at http://
(on file with the
www.columbialawreview.org/Sidebar/volume/109/31_Young.pdf
Columbia Law Review) (footnote omitted).
236. Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism
and Neutral Principles, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 781, 797 (1983).
237. I need not here engage the controversy over the pace of that development. See
supra note 214.
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Austin, we cannot.2 3 8 Positivism has thoroughly eroded the founding
generation's conception of a general law existing independently of any
territorial sovereign. 239 In his famous dissent in Black & White Taxicab &
Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., Justice Holmes
wrote:
[L]aw in the sense in which courts speak of it today does not
exist without some definite authority behind it. The common
law so far as it is enforced in a State, whether called common law
or not, is not the common law generally but the law of that State
existing by the authority of that State . . . .240
These ideas were in wide circulation. Thus, the well known law reformer David Dudley Field wrote: "The notion that common law is something floating in the atmosphere, visible only to the initiated, is one of
those mythical phantasms which serve to amuse and deceive indolent credulity. Where, then, is this common law to be found? In the decisions of
the judges, and there only." 241
In Holmes's writings, of course, these developments famously came
together, 242 and thereafter the instrumental or legislative character of
judge-made law took firm hold. 243 The founding generation would not
have understood our conception of a federal common law binding on the
state courts, or its consciously "legislative" character. Nor would they
have understood Professor Clark's conception: applying or not applying
rules of decision based upon freestanding judicial conceptions of the implications of federalism and separation of powers. 244
It thus appears that federal common law, as we understand the term,
cannot find a home in originalism, at least not in the intellectual world of
originalism as understood by the founding generation. But is this a case
where it has taken time, a considerable time to be sure, for us to "liquidate" or "fix" the meaning of the Constitution? At the end of the day, can
238. See generally John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (2d ed.
London, J. Murray 1861-1863); H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (1961).
239. William R. Casto, The Erie Doctrine and the Structure of Constitutional
Revolutions, 62 Tul. L. Rev. 907, 921-30 (1987) [hereinafter Casto, Erie Doctrine].
240. 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting), quoted with approval in Erie
R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938).
241. David Dudley Field, Judicial Delays: First Report to the American Bar
Association (1885), in 3 Speeches, Arguments, and Miscellaneous Papers of David Dudley
Field 162, 183 (Titus Munson Coan ed., New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1890). Field's
brother, Justice Stephen Field, expressed similar sentiments in his well known dissent in
Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 397 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting) ("The law
of the State on many subjects is found only in the decisions of its courts . . . .").
242. Holmes was deeply influenced by Austin. See Casto, Erie Doctrine, supra note
239, at 924 n. 114. The instrumental character ofjudge-made law is clear in Oliver Wendell
Holmes, The Common Law 120, 126-30 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Belknap Press 1963)
(1881).
243. For a description of these developments, see Brian Z. Tamanaha, Law as a Means
to an End (2006).
244. See supra Part II.C.
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a body of federal common law be justified, as Clark proposes, on the basis
of inferences drawn from the constitutional structure, particularly its federalism and separation of power components? (This issue, of course, now
most saliently presses in the intense debate over the status of customary
international law. 24 5) Something along this line is, of course, what I suggested many years ago in "Constitutional Common Law."2 4 6 If this is
plausible, can we truly say that it provides an originalist foundation for
federal common law, even if it is one not readily apparent to members of
the founding generation? 2 47
IV.

OlUGINALiSM/TEXTUALISM's LIMITS

While this Article is not intended to be an extended exegesis on constitutional interpretation, 2 48 I do wish to conclude briefly with two general observations on the interpretive limits of originalism-driven textualism. First, all forms of originalism seem to me to assume much greater
clarity about the original understanding than in fact existed. Different
understandings of the text, rather than a single cohesive understanding,
frequently and simultaneously existed. Second, originalism in any form
cannot account for the significant, embedded, and quite irreversible departures from original understanding of the text that have taken hold
throughout our constitutional history. Originalism-driven textualism,
therefore, cannot provide a satisfactory theory of our current practice of
constitutional adjudication.

245. See Hart and Wechsler, Sixth Edition, supra note 5, at 675-79 (collecting
sources).
246. See Monaghan, Constitutional Common Law, supra note 160.
247. Such an analysis should be especially congenial to those "originalists" who are
comfortable with "finding" new, previously hidden legal meanings in the constitutional
text, which nonetheless mysteriously "still constrains us." Steven D. Smith, Higher Law
Questions: A Prelude to the Symposium, 36 Pepp. L. Rev. 463, 468-69 (2009). In a recent
article, Professor Manning denies that inferences from a freestanding conception of
federalism provide an appropriate basis for constitutional interpretation, because they
ignore the compromises that went into the original document. Manning, Federalism,
supra note 8, at 2008-09. But see Horne v. Flores, 129 S. Ct. 2579 (2009), in which a
majority of the Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, drew upon freestanding conceptions
of federalism to require dissolution of a federal court injunction governing state spending.
This Article is not the occasion to examine these issues. For a critical initial reaction,
however, see Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Legitimacy of Freestanding
Federalism, 122 Harv. L. Rev. F. 98 (2009), at http://www.harvardlawreview.org/forum/
issues/1 22/juneO9/metzger.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
248. For a recent and illuminating discussion of this general topic, see Vicki C.
Jackson, Multi-Valanced Constitutional Interpretation and Constitutional Comparisons:
An Essay in Honor of Mark Tushnet, 26 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 599 (2008).
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A. Originalism/Textualism'sInterpretive Limits
Textualism, in theory, can be separated from originalism. 2 49 A textualist, for example, could espouse a theory of current or evolving meaning.2 50 I need not consider such possibilities here, since the Supremacy
Clause textualists I confront all purport to be originalists, circa 1788.251
While their views may differ in important ways,25 2 these textualists undertake a common approach to the constitutional text that seeks to discover
or decode its ascertainable original "public understanding," an understanding fixed at (or near) the time of ratification. 2 53 Decoding may,
249. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 125, 136 (1977) (noting
"confusion ... between the two senses of 'strict' construction").
250. See, for example, the long decisional line stemming from the plurality opinion
in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (plurality opinion), which announcedwithout any support in original understanding, so far as I can see-that the Eighth
Amendment focuses upon "evolving standards of decency."
251. Original understanding can come in other forms, of course. For some, it consists
of looking to the past simply to extract-or should I say inject-some very general
(modem) principles. See supra note 247. For a recent effort to marry originalism to the
claimed benefits of a so-called "living" Constitution, see Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and
Original Meaning, 24 Const. Comment. 291, 293 (2007). Professor Balkin depicts the text
as open and vague, emphasizes "the original meaning of the Constitution and . . . the
principles that underlie the text," and then generalizes these principles at a high level of
abstraction. Id. at 293-94; see also Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional
Redemption, 24 Const. Comment. 427 (2007) (responding to critics and elaborating on
his thesis). Unsurprisingly, Professor Balkin concludes that "[o]riginal meaning
originalism and living constitutionalism are compatible positions. In fact, they are two
sides of the same coin." Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living
Constitution, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 549, 549 (2009). As Yogi Berra would say, "it's d6ji vu all
over again." See generally Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 353 (1981) [hereinafter Monaghan, Perfect Constitution] (reviewing earlier
perfectionist theorists).
After surveying the wide variations in originalist theories, Thomas B. Colby and Peter
Smith remark that "the originalist tent keeps getting bigger." Thomas B. Colby & PeterJ.
Smith, Living Originalism, 59 Duke L.J. 238, 257 (2009). For them, "[a] review of
originalists' work reveals originalism to be not a single, coherent, unified theory of
constitutional interpretation, but rather a smorgasbord of distinct constitutional theories
that share little in common except a misleading reliance on a single label." Id. at 244.
Despite its off putting title, Professor Mitchell N. Berman's Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 1 (2009), is a careful and exhaustive ninety-six page examination of the structure of
various originalist claims, which he sorts generally into "hard" and "soft" originalism.
252. Many are viewed as espousing what would be described as judicially and
politically conservative or libertarian views. But that is not the case with respect to
Professors Amar or Balkin.
253. See, e.g., Randy Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of
Liberty 91-117 (2004) [hereinafter Barnett, Restoring] (arguing originalist approach to
constitutional interpretation best preserves Constitution's legitimacy); John 0. McGinnis &
Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation
and the Case Against Construction, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 751, 761-65 (2009) [hereinafter
McGinnis & Rappaport, Original Methods] (arguing in favor of "original public meaning
approach" that should employ "original interpretive rules"); see also Bellia & Clark, supra
note 11, at 84-90 (arguing that after some false starts, early Court got original
understanding right with respect to appropriate role of law of nations).
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of course, entail the use of dictionaries, and perhaps other selected
texts. 2 54
I put to the side the question ofjust how devoted the founding generation itself was to textualism, as opposed to other approaches, as the
controlling interpretive technique. 255 But they were all originalists. Page
after page of David Currie's monumental studies of the Constitution in
the Supreme Court and then in Congress demonstrates the powerful grip
of originalism on the Founders and successive generations.2 5 6 Equally,
however, page after page of his work shows that from the very beginning
sharp and continuous controversy existed over what the Constitution
meant. This is not surprising of a document that, in Farrand's words, was
a "bundle of compromises."2 57 Those compromises generated multiple
understandings among both their Framers and their ratifiers.2 58
Professor Forrest McDonald, for example, writes:
254. The extent to which originalists may properly consult other historical materials
besides dictionaries is open to debate. Professor Manning has a particularly restrictive view
of those materials that may properly be consulted. See John F. Manning, Textualism and
the Role of The Federalistin Constitutional Adjudication, 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1337, 1365
(1998) ("Given the historical status of The Federalist, a textualist judge must treat [it] as a
source of highly informed persuasion-to be evaluated critically on the merits, but never
to be taken at face value as an authoritative exposition of constitutional meaning.").
Professor Manning explains:
[Textualists] are skeptical of the use of background intent or purpose to
contradict the clear import of an otherwise precise statutory text. When
textualists do not feel the pinch of a precise text, they think it appropriate for
judges to try to make related texts coherent with one another....
... When used properly, such analysis does not depend on background purpose
to contradict a precise text, but rather reads an ambiguous provision in light of
other parts of the same text.
Manning, Precise Texts, supra note 8, at 1707 n.160 (citations omitted).
255. See William Michael Treanor, Against Textualism, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 983, 985
(2009) ("[Clourts did not assign [the] text the dominant role in interpreting the
Constitution in the way that modern textualists posit."); see also David P. Currie, The
Constitution in the Supreme Court: The First Hundred Years 1789-1888, at 33 (1985)
[hereinafter Currie, Constitution in the Supreme Court] (noting varying methods of
interpretation utilized by early Supreme Court). Contra McGinnis & Rappaport, Original
Methods, supra note 253, at 793-802 (partially challenging Treanor).
256. See generally 1 David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Federalist
Period 1789-1801 (1997); 2 David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The
Jeffersonians 1801-1828 (2001); 3 David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress:
Democrats and Whigs 1829-1861 (2005); 4 David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress:
Descent into the Maelstrom 1829-1861 (2005); Currie, Constitution in the Supreme
Court, supra note 255.
257. Farrand, Framing, supra note 63, at 201. In the same vein, Jack Rakove
characterizes the Constitutional Convention as "a cumulative process of bargaining and
compromise" rather than an "advanced seminar in constitutional theory." Rakove, supra
note 59, at 15.
258. One must be careful not to overstate the matter, however. Much was also settled
by the Constitution, such as the unitary President, two senators from each state, and one
"supreme Court." See U.S. Const. art. II, § 1; id. art. I, § 3; id. art. III, § 1.
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Because the United States had not one body of lawgivers but
thirteen, and because the thirteen states had thirteen different
histories, cultures, heritages-sometimes widely different, as between New Englanders and South Carolinians or between
Rhode Islanders and other Yankees, sometimes subtly different,
as between the denizens of Massachusetts and those of
Connecticut-it follows that what those lawgivers understood
they were doing varied from state to state.

. .

. All the states rati-

fied the same Constitution, but each read it and understood it
in its own way.2 59
Writers who are historians frequently frame such claims at the macro
level. 260 For me, the indeterminacy problem is readily apparent throughout the document. What, for example, was the original understanding of
the meaning of a civil trial by jury?2 61
The Constitution's perceived indeterminacies necessarily create considerable interpretive problems. In his Commentaries on the Constitution,
Story insisted that the Constitution must "have a fixed, uniform, permanent" meaning, and so far as "human infirmity will allow . . . [it should
be] the same yesterday, to-day, and forever."2 6 2 And led by Justice Scalia,
modern textualists tell us that we must focus on the original public understanding. 263 Yes, but what then? Our whole constitutional history
259. Forrest McDonald, Foreword to M.E. Bradford, Original Intentions, at ix, x
(1993).
260. Parenthetically, I note that a close reading of their work often shows a belief that
much of importance was indeed settled at the time of the ratification. Bradford's Original
Intentions, for example, vigorously argues that the Founders were united in their (and
apparently Bradford's) opposition to democracy and equality. See id. at 32 ("It is
impossible to understand what the Framers attempted with the Constitution of the United
States without first recognizing why most of them dreaded pure democracy . . . ."). This is
a point also emphasized by Gordon Wood. See Gordon Wood, The Radicalism of the
American Revolution 231-33 (Vintage Books 1993) (1991) ("In embracing the idea of
civic equality, however, the revolutionaries had not intended to level their society.").
261. Properly understood, for example, does the original understanding of the
Seventh Amendment disallow "bellwether trials?" See generally Alexandra D. Lahav,
Bellwether Trials, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 576, 589-92 (2008) (discussing bellwether trials in
mass tort cases in light of original understanding of civil trial jury right).
262. 1 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 520
(Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833).
263. See Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 38
(Amy Guttman ed., 1997) [hereinafter Scalia, Matter of Interpretation] ("What I look for
in the Constitution is precisely what I look for in a statute: the original meaning of the
text, not what the original draftsmen intended."). Although he concedes that the two
approaches will converge in nearly all cases, Professor Kay would root textualism in
intentionalism rather than public meaning. See generally Richard S. Kay, Original
Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional Interpretation, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 703
(2009). For an elaborate examination of the importance of intentionalism to the
Founders, see Robert G. Natelson, The Founders' Hermeneutic: The Real Original
Understanding of Original Intent, 68 Ohio St. L.J. 1239 (2007) (stressing relevance of
subjective intent to Founders); see also Berman, supra note 251, at 39-59 (analyzing
structure of intentionalist argument). The classic response is, of course, H. Jefferson
Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 885 (1985)
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shows that in many instances several "public understandings" existed,
which, as I have explained, becomes graphically apparent in reading the
late David Currie's works. 26 4 Moreover, circa 1788, many Founders in
fact believed that they had not yet established a fixed meaning for many
parts of the Constitution. Hamilton and Madison certainly believed as
much. As Caleb Nelson demonstrates in a splendid essay, Hamilton's
view that over the course of time subsequent interpretations would "fix"
the meaning of contested language was a widely shared premise in contemporary thought:
To be sure, James Madison and other prominent founders did
not consider the Constitution's meaning to be fully settled at the
moment it was written. They recognized that it contained ambiguities and that subsequent interpreters would help "fix" its
meaning on disputed points. Contrary to the suggestion of
some critics, though, they did not envision a perpetually evolving meaning on each of these points. Once practice had settled
upon one of the possible interpretations of a disputed provision,
they expected that interpretation to persist. Their talk of "fixing" the Constitution's meaning makes this expectation clear; as
we shall see, it resonates with discussions of language change
that were at the forefront of eighteenth-century lexicography.
For the founding generation's men of letters, the concept of
"fixing" meaning connoted permanence and immutability. 2 65
One could, of course, argue that the subsequent "fixing" or "liquidation" of the document simply excavated the "true" original understanding of 1788.266 But as a realistic premise for sustained reasoning about
the process of constitutional interpretation, that seems to me quite fanciful. When an issue is presented for resolution matters a great deal as to
how it will be resolved-or, if you prefer, how the original understanding
of the relevant text will be understood.2 67 Since some (much?) original
[hereinafter Powell, Original Understanding] (arguing Framers did not intend for future
generations to interpret Constitution based on Framers' own intent). For the purposes of
this Article, I need not enter this controversy.
264. Some textualists presuppose a sophisticated interpreter, "intelligent and
informed people of the time." Scalia, Matter of Interpretation, supra note 263, at 38; see
also Kay, supra note 263, at 722 ("[W]e are interested in people who were fluent in
language, conversant with the historical and constitutional discourse of the time, and fully
familiar with the issues at stake in any particular act of constitution-making. . . ."). This is
despite an illiteracy rate of between twenty and thirty-five percent. Id. at 706 n.12. Others
are less demanding-less elitist, if you will-requiring only a "reasonable reader or
author." McGinnis & Rappaport, Original Methods, supra note 253, at 761 n.29.
265. Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 519,
521 (2003) [hereinafter Nelson, Originalism].
266. The founding generation seems to have viewed this as a delegation to future
"liquidators," a view Madison seems to have held. See The Federalist No. 37 (James
Madison), supra note 1, at 198 ("All new laws . . . are considered as more or less obscure
and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained . . . .").
267. Consider, for example, the issue of affirmative action. What result if presented
in sharp relief in 1955? 1980? 2010? See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2681-83
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meaning was not "fixed" in 1788, the possibility of "liquidating" the "true"
1788 understanding of that text recedes significantly. 26 8
Acknowledging that some constitutional provisions would require future liquidation, many prominent originalists, however, would accept
only those liquidating precedents that arose close in time to the founding.2 69 Such liquidations, it is argued, were part of the Constitution, and
thus did not "evolve." 2 70 But to my eyes, liquidation could, presumably,
take a very long time, in part because of the vagaries as to when issues are
litigated. 271 Consider, for example, the current controversy over "the
unitary executive," which concerns the President's control over the ad(2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing Court's decision merely delays future decision on
whether disparate impact provisions of Title VII violate Equal Protection Clause).
268. I put aside here the additional problem of the reliability of sources of original
understanding, particularly the ratification debates. See generally James H. Hutson, The
Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary Record, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 1
(1986). Moreover, I recognize that important disagreement existed from the beginning
about which interpretive canons should be used to flesh out the text's meaning. There
seems to be widespread agreement that terms referring to the common law should assume
their common law meaning. But even here, difficulties are apparent, since the common
law itself would be taken over only to the extent that it was "adapted" to our uses. In any
event, apart from common law references, should the Constitution be viewed as a contract?
A super statute? A treaty? Should the rules of the common law be used in interpreting the
Constitution? See Nelson, Originalism, supra note 265, at 560-78 (discussing use of
various rules of interpretation to determine original meaning). For a recent sally into this
area, reviewing much of the current writing on the topic, see McGinnis & Rappaport,
Original Methods, supra note 253. Does the answer vary according to the specific
provision at issue?
In a Constitution assumed to make these subsequent "liquidations" binding on future
generations, such interpretive uncertainties fueled the inevitable disagreements over the
document's meaning. See Nelson, Originalism, supra note 265, at 577-78 ("Because of the
Constitution's novelty . . . the range of [interpretive] conventions that might apply was
broad."). Several interpretive possibilities would emerge and one would ultimately achieve
enough stability to "fix" or "liquidate" the meaning of the constitutional provision.
Nonetheless, this area of uncertainty over interpretive canons seems never to have assumed
overriding importance, since interpretation of the Constitution fell quickly into the hands
of "We the Lawyers," not "We the People." See McGinnis & Rappaport, Original Methods,
supra note 253, at 770-72 (arguing drafting of Constitution in name of "We the People"
did not necessarily convey intention to use ordinary-as opposed to legal-methods of
interpretation).
269. See, e.g., Barnett, Trumping Precedent, supra note 44, at 267-69 (noting
Madison's understanding that some constitutional language would require liquidation, but
once 'fixed,' this meaning cannot then be trumped by later judicial decision").
270. See Nelson, Originalism, supra note 265, at 535 ("Madison believed in the
inevitability of linguistic change, [but] did not think that this change should affect the
meaning of laws or constitutions."); see also Powell, Original Understanding, supra note
263, at 939-41 (describing Madison's view that constitutional meaning could be fixed by
governmental practice). Professor Powell himself believes that constitutional meaning can
evolve over time. See infra note 299 and accompanying text.
271. See Hart and Wechsler, Sixth Edition, supra note 5, at 96 ("Isn't it predictable
that it would sometimes-perhaps often-take the institutions responsible for
implementing the Constitution a long period of time to come to rest on how to
understand certain elements of a highly complex constitutional structure?").
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ministration of law. "Strong Unitarians" insist that the President must
have ultimate control of all decisionmaking in the administration of federal law. 272 We are, of course, in a sense, all unitary executivists. The real
question is, what does that mean? Surely, it could have meant what the
Strong Unitarians believe that it meant; but our traditions have thus far
reached a different understanding, one consistent with curbing the
President's control over initial decisionmaking, as well as the President's
ability to remove officials. 27 3 This reflects the way in which a good deal of
our constitutional doctrine has developed: a recognition that many constitutional provisions require time (in this case a lot of time), and the
choice of one interpretive pattern over another (here, settled governmental practice), in order to "fix" or "liquidate" their meaning. 274
To my mind, original understanding circa 1789 will certainly rule out
some interpretations, and on some occasions it can definitively fix meaning. But in a significant number of instances, original understanding will
do no more than establish a permissible range of original "understandings." While he does not challenge this general proposition, Professor
Clark asks us to believe that the Supremacy Clause was a "precise" compromise, the meaning of which was, at least in a very significant regard,
clearly and indisputably understood in 1789.275 As this Article makes
plain, I believe close inspection demonstrates that the relevant historical
past is far more complex than Clark acknowledges. More generally, those
who seek to find the "true" Constitution in the past, particularly a past
272. Many such writers now concede, reluctantly, that the President may be able to
exercise that "control" only through the removal process, rather than by legally dictating
the subordinate's initial decision. See, e.g., John F. Manning, The Independent Counsel
Statute: Reading "Good Cause" in Light of Article II, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 1285 (1999)
(arguing President can often be limited to good cause discharges, but such discharges
must include policy disagreements with executive and administrative officials).
273. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 657-58 (1988) (upholding restrictions on
presidential power to remove officers). Current understandings of the removal power may
change as a result of Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board, 537 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2378 (May 18, 2009) (No.
08-861), argued Dec. 7, 2009. See also Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 610
(1838) (holding presidential directive is no defense to claim that Secretary of the Treasury
violated his statutory duties).
274. Compare Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive
(2008) (arguing for strong, unitary executive), with Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or "The
Decider"? The President in Administrative Law, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 696 (2007)
(arguing President's role is that of "overseer," not "decider"). For an important recent
contribution, see Stephen Skowronek, The Conservative Insurgency and Presidential
Power: A Developmental Perspective on the Unitary Executive, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 2071,
2095 (2009) ("The new construction [by modern unitary theorists] does not seek to roll
back presidential powers as they have developed over time; it seeks, rather, to press forward
the case for presidential government without reference to latter-day [i.e. non-originalist]
elaboration of its foundations.").
275. In a similar vein, John Manning believes that the text of the Eleventh
Amendment is a precise compromise that must be respected. See supra note 8. But see
Steven Menashi, Article III as a Constitutional Compromise: Modern Textualism and State
Sovereign Immunity, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1135, 1177-88 (2009) (criticizing Manning).
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clearly fixed as of 1789, all too often seek more of "the" past than it can
deliver.
B. Originalism/Textualism and Current Practice
There is, for me, another and even more decisive objection to
originalism-based textualism as a theory of constitutional adjudication: It
cannot account for a good deal of the contemporary constitutional order;
an order, I believe, that embodies massive departures from any original
understanding of the text. These departures range from paper money, to
the rise of the modem national and welfare regulatory state, to the transformation of the presidency, and to the content of much of our civil liberties law. 276 This new order has been received by the one "supreme
Court" and other law-applying officials; there is, quite clearly, no going
back.2 7 7 Virtually all the important originalist issues related to the current order are now off the table, wholly beyond recall. As Professor
Fallon observes:
[I]t is virtually unimaginable that the Justices could ever renounce long-settled precedents around which public support
and entrenched expectations have developed. A Supreme
Court that held that paper money and Social Security were unconstitutional, that Brown v. Board of Education was wrongly
decided, or that states need not adhere to one-person, one-vote
principles would be rightly denounced by the public as committing grave constitutional errors-even if the Court could
demonstrate compellingly that its rulings reflected the original
understanding in every case. The gravamen of the complaint
against the Court would be that the Constitution that is the fundamental law of the United States is not an exclusively originalist Constitution. 2 78
Justice Scalia and Judge Bork recognize that reality.2 79 Speaking of
paper money, which was first introduced during the Civil War and ini276. Monaghan, Stare Decisis, supra note 50, at 727-39 (describing aforementioned
departures from original understanding of text of Constitution). Some textualists/
originalists will deny that. See, e.g., Paulsen, Does the Constitution?, supra note 47, at
898-909. Indeed, some writers, turning to the past, find it quite compatible with their
preferences and present institutions. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court
1999 Term-Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 26, 68-78
(2000) ("[T]he document [as Amar understands it] is often more normatively attractive.").
277. Except perhaps at the margins. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
551 (1995) (holding federal regulation of firearms in school zones does not fall within
Congress's powers under Commerce Clause). But see Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22
(2005) (holding federal regulation of marijuana use for medical purposes does not violate
Commerce Clause).
278. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Precedent Viewed Through the Lens of
Hartian PositivistJurisprudence, 86 N.C. L. Rev. 1107, 1141-42 (2008) [hereinafter Fallon,
Constitutional Precedent].
279. See Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America 155-59 (1990) ("At the center of
the philosophy of original understanding . .. must stand some idea of when the judge is
bound by prior decisions . . . ."); Scalia, Matter of Interpretation, supra note 263, at 139-40
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tially held unconstitutional, 28 0 Judge Bork wrote: "Whatever might have
been the proper ruling shortly after the Civil War, if ajudge today were to
decide that paper money is unconstitutional, we would think he ought to
28 1
And Justice
be accompanied not by a law clerk but by a guardian."
Scalia has acknowledged that originalism without any allowances for pre2 82
Some second
cedent would be "medicine . . . too strong to swallow."

generation academic originalists, such as Professors Lawson, Amar, and
Paulsen, however, apparently do not agree. 28 3 This is Supremacy Clause
textualism with a vengeance!
If this historical claim about the existence of substantial, judicially
sanctioned departures from original understanding is correct, then
originalists face a problem of central importance: significant irrelevance.
In the contemporary practice of constitutional adjudication, "the text," as
284
David Strauss puts it, "matters most for the least important questions"
28 5
or indeed matters not at all. That has been the reality for some time.
That constitutional "law" involves far more than the text is captured in
the large body of writing, beginning with Christopher Tiedeman more
28 6
than a century ago, that refers to our "unwritten" Constitution.
(stating stare decisis "is a pragmatic exception" to his originalist philosophy). But neither
judge has articulated any principle for determining when stare decisis will be applied.
Fallon, Constitutional Precedent, supra note 278, at 1123-24.
280. Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603, 625 (1869), overruled by Knox v.
Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 544-45 (1871); see also Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421,
450 (1884) (upholding constitutionality of paper money).
281. Bork, supra note 279, at 155.
282. Scalia, Lesser Evil, supra note 49, at 861.
283. See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 44, at 29 ("[A]rguments from prudence go
nowhere unless they are tied to the interpretation of some provision of the constitutional
text."). Professor Barnett does not go quite so far. See Barnett, Trumping Precedent,
supra note 44, at 263-69 (explaining "why the originalist rejection of precedent is not so
radical as it at first appears"); see also Amar, Legal Reasoning, supra note 44; Paulsen,
Corrupting Influence, supra note 44. Professor Fallon writes, and I agree, that these
writers, taken seriously, "are advocates of radical legal change, who should have to bear a
heavy burden of normative justification." Fallon, Constitutional Precedent, supra note
278, at 1125. For a recent effort by two originalists to find space for the role of precedent,
see John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and Precedent,
103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 803 (2009). Applying a cost/benefit analysis, they would, if I am not
mistaken, retain stare decisis for most significant modern precedents on the grounds that
either they have become too deeply entrenched into our constitutional order or overruling
them would prove too destabilizing. Id. at 806.
284. David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev.
877, 916 (1996) [hereinafter Strauss, Common Law].
285. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law For States: International Law,
Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1791, 1808-09 (2009) ("[T]he
constitutional text has contributed little to resolving the vast areas of ambiguity and
disagreement that have arisen. . . ."). Professors Goldsmith and Levinson point out that a

great[ ] number of constitutional issues will never be heard by any court," and that it is
easy to exaggerate the amount of constitutional settlement that judicial review provides."
Id. at 1813-14.
286. See Christopher G. Tiedeman, The Unwritten Constitution of the United States
(New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons 1890); see also William Bennet Munro, The Makers of the
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Is our current practice of nonoriginalist constitutional adjudication
"unconstitutional" or "illegitimate"? For me, that conclusion is far too
destabilizing to contemplate. The true lesson of our constitutional history, I submit, is the failure of a perhaps widely shared vision of the
founding generation: that the written Constitution, unless modified
through Article V, would unalterably constrain future generations.2 8 7
Any acceptable theory of constitutional adjudication should, I believe, have two qualities: (1) It must be normatively acceptable and (2) It
must be able to account for most (though not necessarily every last bit) of
the current constitutional order. On the first requirement, I understand
the strong, immediate, intuitive pull of an originalism-based textualism,
especially since such arguments were the dominant mode of analysis
throughout much of our constitutional history.28 8 Perhaps, more accurately, I should say "originalisms," since there were so many original understandings. Nonetheless, I suspect that many "average Americans"
would assert that the Court must apply "the" true (as in the only) original
understanding of a given constitutional provision. 28 9 Moreover, original
Unwritten Constitution (1930); Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?,
27 Stan. L. Rev. 703 (1975); Todd E. Pettys, The Myth of the Written Constitution, 84
Notre Dame L. Rev. 991 (2009). Even writers sympathetic to originalism sometimes
recognize the need for courts to go beyond constitutional "interpretation" and engage in a
restrained constitutional "construction." See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional
Construction 5 (1999) ("The jurisprudential model needs to be supplemented with a more
explicitly political one that describes a distinct effort to understand and rework the
meaning of a received constitutional text. That more political model is one of
constitutional construction."); Barnett, Restoring, supra note 253, at 121 ("[O]riginal
meaning of the text . . . may still not provide enough guidance . . . . When this occurs, it

becomes necessary to adopt a construction of the text that is consistent with its original
meaning but not deductible from it.").
287. See Howard Gillman, The Collapse of Constitutional Originalism and the Rise of
the Notion of the "Living Constitution" in the Course of American State-Building, 11 Stud.
Am. Pol. Dev. 191, 197-213 (1997) (describing idea of fixed Constitution); Monaghan,
Stare Decisis, supra note 50, at 769 ("[The Constitution] culminated a shift from viewing a
constitution as simply a description of the fundamental political arrangements of the
society to a conception that the constitution stood behind, or grounded and legitimated,
those arrangements-and of course constrained them."); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Constitutional Constraints, 97 Cal. L. Rev. 975, 979, 995 n.94 (2009) (exploring various
ways in which Constitution, as interpreted, currently constrains actors in legal system);
David S. Law, A Theory of Judicial Power and Judicial Review, 97 Geo. LJ. 723 (2009)
(arguing judicial review performs monitoring and coordinating functions, thereby
ensuring constitutional government premised on popular sovereignty).
288. Modern day originalists such as Justice Scalia invoke originalism because it
responds to "the main danger in judicial interpretation of the Constitution[,] . .. that the
judges will mistake their own predilections for the law." Scalia, Lesser Evil, supra note 49,
at 863-64. Professors Manning and Clark, by contrast, defend originalism on the ground
that it is most respectful of the Constitution's compromise.
289. They would, I suspect, also believe that the original document was fundamentally
perfect, which is to say that it reflects their own value judgments. And they would surely
simultaneously reject any conception that the current constitutional order is illegitimate,
to the extent they understood the question. And all the while they would suffer no
cognitive dissonance. SeeJamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 Geo. L.J. 657, 659, 695-96

2010]

SUPREMACY CLAUSE TEXTUALISM

791

understanding theory retains a strong hold on the academic
community. 29 0
I need not pursue this line of inquiry further, however, because for
me originalism fails on the second ground. "The first [problem with
originalism in any form] ... involves the gap between the framers' world
and that which we inhabit." 29 1 This is a world in which the courts have
repeatedly sanctioned transformative and irreversible departures from
original understanding. 292 But the resulting order has not resulted in
any significant challenge to the "legitimacy" of our current nonoriginalist
practice of constitutional adjudication.
Concerns over "legitimacy" generally focus on the conduct of lawapplying officials, particularly judges and other public officials. Here, I,
of course, like many others, follow Hart and look at law from an "internal" point of view. 293 That law is what officials accept and apply as law is
not a new insight: "The binding authority of law," wrote the astute
ChristopherJ. Tiedeman at the end of the nineteenth century, "does not
rest upon any edict of the people in the past; it rests upon the present will
of those who possess the political power."2 94 More broadly, legitimacy
concerns could include a larger "interpretive community," encompassing
practicing lawyers, law professors, and other students of the Court's
work. 2 9 5 (I should be inclined to say interpretive communities, but that
point is not important here.) Simply put, "This Constitution ['s] status as
the 'supreme Law of the Land' is entirely a function of its current accept(2009) (describing statistics showing that "a substantial portion of the American public
reports an affinity for originalism"). Professor Greene attributes the popular appeal of
originalism to three attributes: its simplicity, populism, and nativism. Id. at 708-14. I
would add that originalism plays well to the filiopietism of the American people.
290. See, e.g., materials cited supra notes 8-13; see also Johnathan O'Neill,
Originalism in American Law and Politics (2005), and the essays by historians and political
scientists in Ourselves and Our Posterity (Bradley C.S. Watson ed., 2009), as well as the
essays by prominent judges and legal scholars in Originalism: A Quarter Century of
Debate (Steven G. Calabresi ed., 2007).
291. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Implementing the Constitution 13 (2001) [hereinafter
Fallon, Implementing].
292. Monaghan, Stare Decisis, supra note 50, at 727-29.
293. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 56-57, 88-89, 242 (Peter Cane et al. eds., 2d
ed. 1994). For a stimulating collection of essays on this topic, see The Rule of Recognition
and the U.S. Constitution (Mathew D. Adler & Kenneth Einar Himma eds., 2009)
[hereinafter Rule of Recognition].
294. Tiedeman, supra note 286, at 122.
295. Ordinary citizens do not seem to count in current legitimacy theories, except
perhaps at the margins in setting outer boundaries for judicial conduct. See Fallon,
Constitutional Precedent, supra note 278, at 1138-39 ("Supreme Court Justices who want
to maintain the long-term efficacy of their own rulings must recognize dominant public
sentiment ... as a constraint on this authority to shape constitutional law, at least with
respect to matters of high public salience."). Henry Hart referred to "first-rate" lawyers.
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court 1958 Term-Foreword: The Time Chart of the
Justices, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 101 (1959).
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ance as such." 296 And, as Paul Brest long ago observed: "[I]t is only
through a history of continuing assent or acquiescence that the document could become law. Our constitutional tradition, however, has not
focused on the document alone, but on the decisions and practices of
courts and other institutions. And this tradition has included major elements of nonoriginalism." 9
Accordingly, "[w]hat counts as constitutional law at any given time
will depend on . . . which parts of the text of the Constitution, which
interpretive methods, and which first-order constitutional interpretations
are recognized as authoritative by the relevant recognitional community."29 8 As H. Jefferson Powell puts it, "[clonstitutional law is an historically extended tradition of argument," which draws upon various sources
in addition to the text.299 At the end of the day, our current practices
"should perhaps be understood not as a theory of interpretive meaning,
but rather as a theory, or a partial theory, of the legitimacy of various
forms of interpretive argument in constitutional law."300
Constitutional law adjudication is a practice. Current practice still
recognizes originalism-based textual arguments as "legitimate" legal arguments. District of Columbia v. Helleyso' is, of course, the most recent example of the prominence of originalism-based arguments, and it does not
stand alone.30 2 But originalism is by no means the only such form of
296. "[T]he legal legitimacy of the Constitution depends much more on its present
sociological acceptance (and thus its sociological legitimacy) than upon the (questionable)
legality of its formal ratification." Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution,
118 Harv. L. Rev. 1787, 1792 (2005). This is a widely shared premise of contemporary
constitutional thinking. See Christopher R. Green, "This Constitution": Constitutional
Indexicals as a Basis for Textualist Semi-Originalism, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1607, 1669
n.199 (2009) (collecting authorities); see also Rule of Recognition, supra note 293.
297. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L.
Rev. 204, 225 (1980).
298. Goldsmith & Levinson, supra note 285, at 1811 (footnotes omitted); see also
Jackson, supra note 248, at 637 (explaining constitutional interpretation "requires judicial
self-discipline, located within a particular community's interpretative traditions").
299. H. Jefferson Powell, A Community Built on Words: The Constitution in History
and Politics 5-6 (2002). Professor Felix Frankfurter long ago wrote: "If the Thames is
'liquid history,' the Constitution of the United States is most significantly not a document
but a stream of history. And the Supreme Court has directed the stream." Felix
Frankfurter, The Commerce Clause Under Marshall, Taney and Waite 2 (1937).
300. Jackson, supra note 248, at 661. ProfessorJackson makes a strong normative case
for our current practices, id. at 654-60, and argues that this practice leaves ample room for
disagreement within our legal culture. Id. at 660-70.
301. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
302. See, for example, the recent line of decisions involving the right to trial byjury in
criminal cases: Oregon v. Ice, 129 S. Ct. 711, 717 (2009) (considering originalist
understanding of jury's domain); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42-56 (2004)
(detailing originalist understanding of confrontation of witnesses); Apprendi v. NewJersey,
530 U.S. 466, 478-80 (2000) (detailing originalist understanding of judicial role in
sentencing).
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constitutional interpretation that is broadly accepted today.3 0 3 Arguments from precedent, in fact, play a far more salient role. Since the
early nineteenth century, "the Supreme Court has invoked stare decisis
with great frequency, seldom if ever apologetically."3 0 4 The constitutional text itself often plays only a subordinate role. Examining the
Court's opinions at the end of the 1981 Term, for example, Professor
Harry Jones captured the reality nicely. The "methodological phenomen [on]" that struck him the most was that "two-thirds or more of the
discussion in the opinions" was "about [what] past Supreme Court cases
. . . arguably 'held'" and about their reasoning.3 05 Speaking of the text
itself, he wrote:
The constitutional text is down there somewhere under this
massive overlay of case law development and refinement, but
the usual contest between advocates in the Supreme Court, and
more often than not between or among the Justices, is the kind
of contest that has characterized the common law judicial process at least since the days of Sir Edward Coke, a battle over
cases and what they should be taken to stand for.3 06
More recently, Professor David Strauss has emphasized how much of
the content of constitutional law rests not on the text but emerges from
the common law process of adjudication.3 0 7 He writes:
[W]hen people interpret the Constitution, they rely not just on
the text but also on the elaborate body of law that has developed, mostly through judicial decisions, over the years. In fact,
in the day-to-day practice of constitutional interpretation, in the
courts and in general public discourse, the specific words of the
text play at most a small role, compared to evolving understandings of what the Constitution requires.

. .

. [T]he common law

approach, not the approach that connects law to an authoritative text, or an authoritative decision by the Framers or by "we
the people," . . . best explains, and best justifies, American constitutional law today.30 8
303. See Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate (1982). Professor Bobbitt lists arguments
based on text, history, structure, prudence, and the values peculiar to the Constitution
(ethos) as appropriate considerations. For a recent, more elaborate description of the
various interpretive techniques that have been used by the Court, see Lackland H. Bloom,
Jr., Methods of Interpretation (2009).
304. Fallon, Constitutional Precedent, supra note 278, at 1129. An abbreviated
version of that article appears as Richard Fallon, Precedent-Based Constitutional
Adjudication, Acceptance, and the Rule of Recognition, in Rule of Recognition, supra note
293, at 47.
305. Harry W. Jones, Dyson Distinguished Lecture: Precedent and Policy in
Constitutional Law, 4 Pace L. Rev. 11, 12 (1983).
306. Id. at 13.
307. See Strauss, Common Law, supra note 284, at 883-84 (noting dominant role of
doctrine over text in constitutional law).
308. Id. at 877, 879; see also Scalia, Lesser Evil, supra note 49, at 852. Justice Scalia
notes:

794

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 110:731

Unless we are prepared to condemn our existing constitutional practice
as illegitimate, the propriety of other modes of argument besides originalism, particularly those based upon precedent, must be acknowledged.3 0 9
Their "validation is [their] pedigree," to borrow from Justice Scalia,3 1 0 or,
more accurately, is in their long and widespread acceptance. 3 1 1
I have never been persuaded that an airtight case can be made for
the priority of the text over the case law. 312 1 recognize that we do not
have a tradition that formally acknowledges the case law as possessing a
status "equal" to the constitutional text itself.31 3 Moreover, as David
Strauss points out, "it is no part of our [constitutional] practice ever to
'overrule' a textual provision."3 1 4 Constitutional law without the written
Constitution is "unthinkable. "315
Unthinkable? Perhaps. Candor, however, requires recognition of a
deep problem inherent in any theory of constitutional adjudication that
places substantial reliance on current practice: The role of a written constitution in constitutionaladjudicationcannot be specified with any real clarity. In
such a system, the document, rather than occupying the position of fundamental law, can become little more than a background discursive
framework or a weak gravitational field in which the process of constitutional adjudication is carried on. David Strauss's recent article, "The
It would be hard to count on the fingers of both hands and the toes of both
feet ... the opinions that have in fact been rendered not on the basis of what the
Constitution originally meant, but on the basis of what the judges currently
thought it desirable for it to mean.
Id.
309. I quite agree with Professor Greene that "[t]he theoretical failing of originalism
is that it lacks an account of how legitimate constitutional change occurs outside the
Constitution's text or original understanding." Greene, supra note 289, at 701. This is
true of the originalists I consider in this Article. It is not true, however, of the versions of
originalism espoused by Professors Amar and Balkin.
310. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 621 (1990).
311. Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution, 85 Mich. L.
Rev. 621, 654 (1987) ("[T]he force of precedent ... is an aspect of our law because of
acceptance."). That article is reprinted in Rule of Recognition, supra note 293, at 1, along
with Professor Greenawalt's further reflections. See Kent Greenawalt, How to Understand
the Rule of Recognition and the American Constitution, reprinted in Rule of Recognition,
supra note 293, at 145-73. The latter article focuses on the importance of the fact that
officials often defer to the determinations of other officials as to what is to count as law.
312. Monaghan, Stare Decisis, supra note 50, at 770-72.
313. Id. at 757 ("The view that ajudicial precedent is the equivalent of a legislative act
has never existed in American law, and no one has proposed that it should." (citation
omitted)). A fortiori, as to the Constitution. See Jackson, supra note 248, at 632-36
(arguing constitutional text is distinguished from case law both because text is more
binding and because of difficulty of changing it).
314. Strauss, Common Law, supra note 284, at 899.
315. Monaghan, Stare Decisis, supra note 50, at 773 (quoting Richard S. Kay, The
Illegality of the Constitution, 4 Const. Comment. 57, 57 (1987)); see also Monaghan,
Perfect Constitution, supra note 251, at 383 ("The authoritative status of the written
constitution is . . . an incontestable first principle for theorizing about American
constitutional law.").
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Modernizing Mission of Judicial Review,"3 16 is illustrative. By and large
he defends a conception ofjudicial review in which " [t] he governing idea
of the modernization view is that statutes are unconstitutional just because, and to the extent that, they do not reflect true popular sentiment."3 1 7 The focus of constitutional adjudication "more or less consciously, looks to the future, not the past; [and] tries to bring laws up to
date, rather than deferring to tradition; and ... anticipates and accommodates, rather than limits, developments in popular opinion."3 1 8 The
defense proffered for this proposition is, so far as I can see, grounded
entirely in historical practice.
This is not the occasion to attempt to formulate a comprehensive
theory of constitutional adjudication.3 1 9 "One can say, however, that no
incontrovertible showing can be made that the Court must always adhere
to the original understanding of the constitutional text."3 20 More particularly, one can say that the resolving power of precedent in constitutional
adjudication is considerable, even with respect to constitutional issues of
lesser magnitude. Consider, for example, Justice Stevens's opinion for
the Court in Taylor v. Illinois:
The State's argument is supported by the plain language of the
[Compulsory Process] Clause, . . . by the historical evidence that
it was intended to provide defendants with subpoena power that
they lacked at common law, by some scholarly comment, and by
a brief excerpt from the legislative history of the Clause. We
have, however, consistently given the Clause the broader reading reflected in contemporaneous state constitutional
provisions.3 21
Or consider, for example, Chief Justice Roberts's recent one paragraph concurring opinion (joined by Justice Scalia) in Rothgery v. Gillespie
County.322 The case addressed the question of when the right to counsel
attaches. In dissent, Justice Thomas argued that English and American
authorities established that the right attached only when formal process
had issued against the defendant. 323 The Chief Justice responded that
'Justice Thomas's analysis of the present issue is compelling, but I believe
316. David A. Strauss, The Modernizing Mission ofJudicial Review, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev.
859 (2009).
317. Id. at 898.
318. Id. at 860.
319. There is precedent for this. Me! I have run away from this task before. See
Monaghan, Stare Decisis, supra note 50, at 773. But the problem is a deep and insistent
one: The first premise of reasoning is that "a constitution establishes the supreme law that
prevails in collision with all other law." Fallon, Implementing, supra note 291, at 113.
320. Monaghan, Stare Decisis, supra note 50, at 773.
321. 484 U.S. 400, 407-08 (1988) (citations omitted).
322. The Chief Justice added a sentence joining Justice Alito's concurring opinion.
128 S. Ct. 2578, 2592 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., concurring). For a more comprehensive
statement of the ChiefJustice's views on precedent in constitutional cases, see Citizens
United v. FEC, No. 08-205 (U.S. Jan. 21, 2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
323. Rothgery, 128 S. Ct. at 2595-605 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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that the result here is controlled by [two prior decisions of the Court]. A
sufficient case has not been made for revisiting those precedents, and
accordingly I join the Court's opinion." 324 And just this last Term the
Court relied upon its precedents, as against text-based arguments, in construing the tonnage and confrontation clauses.3 2 5
This is not the occasion to consider whether one can or should "prioritize" the various kinds of arguments now advanced as a matter of our
constitutional practice.3 26 My specific concern is with the role of precedent. Professor Fallon, following the Court, views adherence to precedent as a matter of policy, and more importantly, apparently as an openended matter of policy at that.327 My own view, in short, is that
nonadherence to precedent requires special justification, because adherence to precedent fosters the central goals of the Constitution: establishing stability and continuity in the governmental order.328
CONCLUSION

The Supremacy Clause textualists I have discussed in this Article invite us to rethink the meaning of the word "Laws," and even more importantly, the role of precedent in constitutional adjudication. Even if I were
convinced that their analysis reflected "the" original understanding of the
text, I would not now pick up their invitation. One must be convinced
that important gains of some kind are to be achieved by overthrowing
entrenched practice. To my mind, no such case has been made.

324. Id. at 2592 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
325. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009); Polar Tankers, Inc.
v. City of Valdez, 129 S. Ct. 2277 (2009).
326. Professor Fallon believes such a prioritization is both possible and desirable. See
Richard H. FallonJr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation,
100 Harv. L. Rev. 1189, 1193-94 (1987). Professor Bobbitt, on the other hand, denies the
feasibility of any such project. Bobbitt, supra note 303, at 181; see alsoJackson, supra note
248, at 660 ("[O]ne of the advantages of this interpretive approach is its recognition of the
possibilities for reasonable disagreement on the weight of and interaction among the
different, legitimate sources of interpretation.").
327. Fallon, Constitutional Precedent, supra note 278, at 1124.
328. Monaghan, Stare Decisis, supra note 50, at 748-55; see also Thomas Merrill,
Originalism, Stare Decisis, and the Promotion of Judicial Restraint, 22 Const. Comment.
271, 273 (2005) (arguing in favor of "a strong theory of precedent on grounds of judicial
restraint"). Sometimes the demand for special justification seems to receive only token
respect. SeeJustice Scalia's opinion for a five person majority in Montejo v. Louisiana, 129
S. Ct. 2079, 2088 (2009), overruling Michigan v.Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986) ("We do not
think that stare decisis requires us to expand significantly the holding of a prior decisionfundamentally revisiting its theoretical basis in the process-in order to cure its practical
deficiencies.").

